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This research paper explores the discursive construction of China and Tibet’s national 
identity, and how it interrelates with China-Tibet relations. In contrast to studies suggesting a 
defining and determinant role of national identity on China-Tibet relations, this research paper 
argues that the collective identity of Tibet and China is a hegemonic and highly contested 
construction, and Tibet and China, therefore, should look beyond identity and search for an 
alternative approach to nation/state building without succumbing to either Chinese 
nationalism or Tibetan nationalism. Drawing on the work of some of the critical theorists, this 
research paper shows that it is bound to fail to build a political community based on a 
collective national identity. This research paper proposes that the authorities of Tibet and 
China should negotiate for future institutional reform of the Tibet Question by the recognition 
of the contingent identities of the multitude. 
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Since the ‘peaceful liberation’ of Tibet in 1951 by the new communist government of China 
that led to the first Lhasa uprising and the escape of the Dalai Lama in 1959, with two major 
riots followed in 1989 and 2008, the debate on Tibetan nationhood has been continuing. The 
trouble of the Tibet Question (Goldstein 1995: 2) is above all self-evident in the disputed 
name. There are three ways to understand what ‘Tibet’ is. First, the Chinese Tibet, or political 
Tibet, is roughly corresponding to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Second, the Ethnographic Tibet, or cultural Tibet, is the so-called 
Greater Tibet, which includes all areas where ‘Tibetans’ live, including the TAR, parts of 
Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces1. Third, the Tibet in Exile is a vague term, 
which covers all areas where the Tibetans in exile live, mainly in India, Nepal, and Bhutan2.  
 
The contemporary debate of the Tibet Question3 traces back to the Dalai Lama’s flight to 
India after the riot in 1959 and the establishment of the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE). 
Since then the Dalia Lama and the TGIE have been the key driver for the Tibetan nationalist 
movement, and interestingly this authority of Tibet is not in ‘Tibet’ any more. The Dalai Lama 
since has become the prominent representative of the Tibetan people and a globally respected 
icon of peace, as claimed by the TGIE. The PRC, however, consistently condemns that the 
Tibetan independence issues are created by both the ‘Dalai clique’ and Western imperialism, 
insisting the PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet. The Dalai Lama is viewed by Beijing as enemy 
                                               
1
 Things will get even more complicated if one starts to question who the ‘Tibetans’ are in this occasion, as commons sense 
that Tibetans are people who live in Tibet does not work. The use of Tibet in this paper refers to the Ethnographic Tibet in 
general, unless specified otherwise. 
2
 The latest figure in 2010 from the PRC shows the population of Tibetans in TAR is about 2.7 million according to 
xinhuanet.com (04/05/2011. access on 08/01/2012). The Chinese census in 2000 shows there are about 6 million Tibetans 
living in the Ethnographic Tibet; The TGIE’s figures show that more than 145,000 Tibetans live in exile (Fisher 2011). 
3
 The Tibet Question is certainly multi-dimensional, including the issues of sovereignty, ethnicity, cultural autonomy, 
development, and human rights, to name just a few. This paper, however, focuses on the national identity dispute in China-
Tibet relations. 
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number one, described as a ‘wolf in monk’s robes’ and ‘a monster with human face’, and his 
image is banned in the TAR4. 
 
The Tibet Question occupies a significant position in the politics of China, Central Asia, and 
between China and the world. The debate on the Tibetan Question spans across the issues of 
economy, culture, religion, identity, environment, and human rights, in political science and 
international relations (IR). The debate has attracted so much attention from state 
governments through to the politicians, international support groups, human rights 
organizations, environmental specialists, and academics, that it has always been an 
international issue.  
 
The debate of the Tibetan Question is constantly caught in dichotomies: either patriots or 
reactionaries for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); patriots or traitors for Tibetans; pro-
China or pro-Tibet; the focus of recognition or redistribution; the developmental problems 
caused by the Western model or the Chinese model; and either the romantics or the realists. 
Each oppositional perspective has expended an enormous amount of time and effort and 
strives to represent the universal claims of history and truth, the result being diametrically 
opposed constructions of reality’ (Goldstein 2004, quoted in Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 4). 
There have been so many diverse and often contradictory perspectives commented about 
Tibet that perhaps no other place on earth can be much more so. 
 
For the Chinese CCP, Tibet is undisputedly a part of China. President Hu Jintao declares, ‘the 
peaceful liberation of Tibet was a major event in modern Chinese history and an epoch-
making turning point in the course of development in Tibet’. 5  State propaganda CCTV 
announced that Lhasa was awarded the ‘2010 City With the Happiest People’6. For Tibetans, 
at least the representative TGIE, Tibet is a distinctively separate civilization from the Chinese 
one. The PRC claims Tibetans are among 56 ethnic nationalities bound closer together by a 
                                               
4
 ’17 Points of Disagreement: 60 years of China’s failed policies in Tibet’, 
http://www.tibetnetwork.org/17pointsofdisagreements (access on 09/02/2012). 
5
 Hu Jintao, Lhasa, 19 July 2001. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/16/content_10205324.htm (access on 
02/02/2012) 
6
 ’17 Points of Disagreement: 60 years of China’s failed policies in Tibet’, 
http://www.tibetnetwork.org/17pointsofdisagreements (access on 09/02/2012). 
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common destiny. From Tibetan’s point of view, however, this fabrication is rooted in China’s 
colonization of Tibet and other neighboring territories. Tibet is not only a clearly defined 
nation, but the government of Tibet fulfilled the criteria of a sovereign state three decades 
before the founding of the PRC7.  
 
For the West, their foreign policies are constantly contradictory. On the one hand, both the US 
and the European Union countries condemn China’s policy over Tibet. After the Tibetan 
uprising in 2008, John McCain, as a Republican presidential candidate, said that Tibet was 
one of the first things he would address as president.8 Obama wrote to Bush that the situation 
in Tibet was deeply disturbing, and urged Bush to speak out forcefully and publicly.9 On the 
other hand, the support for Tibet from the West is clearly trumped by other priorities, such as 
national interests, mainly economic and trade, and their more urgent strategic focus, such as 
the Middle East and the War on Terror. The result is that the diplomatic action and foreign 
policy from the West is substantively limited to cultural and identity recognition, human 
rights, and political autonomy. 
 
Amongst all of the above opposing perspectives, the dispute of national identity has become 
prominent, and has fueled the Tibetan nationalist movement. This search for a Tibetan 
nationhood has represented a central element of Tibetan-Chinese relations for decades, and 
proven to be an enduring international issue today and into the future (Bertrand & Laliberte 
2010: 221). This research paper explores the discursive construction of Tibet and China’s 
national identity, and how the identity discourse, amongst other factors such as economy and 
institution, has affected China-Tibet relations. Particularly, this paper highlights how the 
political subjects of China and Tibet have been constructed in contested manners over time. 
Under the rubric of identity / culture, the so-called Tibetan Question is often framed and 
consequently dealt with by state policies in dramatically opposing ways. The primary 
question of this research paper is therefore – Is there an alternative approach to either a 
Tibetan Tibet or a Chinese Tibet for the resolution of the Tibet Question? 
 
                                               
7
 See the official website of the TGIE: http://tibet.net/about-tibet/tibet-at-a-glance/ (access on 05/02/2012). 
8
 ‘McCain says China’s conduct in Tibet unacceptable’, Reuters, 21 March 2008 (access on 05/02/2012). 
9
 See Barack Obama’s letter to President Bush, 28 March 2008 (access on 02/02/2012). 
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This research paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter briefly looks at how the 
Tibet Question is discussed in scholarly literature. This chapter contends that identity politics 
remains a critical platform, among many others, to examine the complexity of the politics in 
Tibet, and paradoxically a threshold to the ultimate solution of the Tibet Question. The second 
chapter discusses how identity politics is theorized divergently by political thinkers. Drawing 
on the work from some of the critical theorists (poststructualist, postcolonialist, and feminist), 
this chapter points to the problematic notion of a collective identity and argues that it is power 
and discourse that make identity seem natural. The third chapter examines the historical and 
social construction of national identity in the PRC and Tibet, and more importantly elicits the 
fragmented, contested, unsustainable nature of a collective identity. The last chapter explores 
possible institutional reform of the Tibet Question. It argues that the future community 
building in Tibet is dependent on institutional reform that is based on the recognition of the 
contingent identities of the multitude. 
 
Chapter 1. Contextualizing the Tibet Question 
13 
 




This first chapter sets out the discussion of the Tibet Question by a brief review of the 
literature in this field and a summary of the major debates amongst the Tibet Question 
scholars. 
1.1 Literature review 
 
There is a constellation of English literature on the subject of the Tibet Question. A quick 
Google-search will return with thousands of book-length text, amongst them about 18-strong 
monographic books dedicated to this particular subject since the recent uprising in 2008. 
Amongst the literature, the divergence in views is enormous. Part of the reason is because of 
the difficulty of mastering the facts in Tibet. The dearth of independent research data makes it 
even worse. Virtually all publications on development in Tibet are based on often-dubious 
official Chinese government statistics (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 193). The primary reason, 
the paper maintains, is the divided and contentious political ideologies and the opposing ways 
of framing the problems that lead to the polarization of the views. 
 
The West has been fascinated by Tibet for centuries. The Tibet Question, in English literature, 
is mostly commented from the traditional perspectives of Westphalian International 
Relations 10 , in an uncritical and unproblematical way based on the European historical 
paradigms. Classic realists assert that politics is governed by laws that are created by 
biological human nature, and that International Relations are best understood through the 
concept of interests defined in terms of power (Morgenthau 1955: 30). Neo-realists continue 
                                               
10
 The Peace Treaties of Westphalia and Osnabruck (1648) established the legal basis of modern statehood and by 
implication the fundamental rules of modern world politics, including: territoriality, sovereignty and autonomy. See more 
detail in: Baylis et al. 2009. The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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to defend the core concept of interest and power, supplemented by looking at how domestic 
politics influences the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior (Waltz 2002: 211). 
 
When it comes to the Tibet Question, not many to date, still see it from a pure orthodox realist 
perspective. Hoffmann, for example, sought to explain the Tibetan question from the 
perspective of a classic security dilemma conceived by the competing powers. He argues that 
in security dilemma states are driven to accumulate ever more power, yet they remain 
insecure because of the competition with their neighbors and rivals (Hoffmann 2006: 193). 
Others comment on the Tibet issue with aspects of the realist view. For example, they include 
China’s concerns of the material and economic potentials of Tibet into their arguments. There 
is certainly validity in realism, which tends to do well explaining the continuity of the 
international structure and power patterns. However, the limitations of realism have been well 
explored, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union11. 
  
Liberals, as usual, uphold the mottos of political freedom, economic development and cultural 
autonomy. A liberal’s view on Tibet is generally two fold. Firstly, for many liberals Tibet is 
romanticized as an innocent and divine place detached from other political powers. For 
example, Smith poses that Tibet is known as the ‘roof of the World’, with its image of 
‘Shangri-la’ based on the unique Tibetan culture and religion (Smith, W 2008: x).  Secondly, 
liberals easily draw a clear line between the Chinese authoritarian regime and the oppressed 
Tibet. Thus the resolution of the Tibet Question has to be one ideology’s victory over the 
other one.  Can liberalism solve the Tibet Question? Fukuyama hails about the victory of 
neoliberalism. He argued in 1992 that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of 
liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past 
few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most 
recently communism. More than that, however, he argued that liberal democracy may 
constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human 
government,’ and as such constituted the ‘end of history.’ (Fukuyama 1992). History, 
however, clearly diverges from Fukuyama’s assertion, and reality unequivocally shows the 
                                               
11
 The main criticism for contemporary realism is from social constructivism (Wendt 1999), and a group of alternative, or 
anti-foundational, theories, such as post-modernism, feminism, historical sociology, and post-colonialism (Baylis et al. 
2010). 
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problems of promoting liberalism around the globe, for example the democratization in the 
East Europe after the Cold War, and the recent Iraq wars. 
 
Constructivists have also made a strong case that culture and identity matter. In a nutshell, 
constructivists maintain that ideas and preferences decide the behaviour patterns of the 
actors12. Prominent scholar Huntington highlights the critical role of culture in world politics. 
He writes, ‘The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will 
be cultural. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future’. (Huntington 1993: 22) In response to the 
rise of China, for example, Kang asserts that China’s aggressive approach to Taiwan should 
not be looked at as power expansionist behaviour, nor be conceived as a realist notion of 
tipping the balance of power in the region. Rather, the Taiwan problem is China’s 
disagreement on Taiwan’s proclaimed independent identity, and it is an integral part of 
China’s unfinished nationalistic project (Kang 2007: 5). Obviously for constructivists, the 
‘ideas matter’ thesis is equally compelling in the case of Tibet. In fact, constructivism has 
become the conventional wisdom to explain the Tibet problem through the framing of 
national identity conflicts. For instance, Wolff maintains that the twentieth century proved that 
ethnicity is a more enduring human characteristic than class (Wolff 2010: i). Topgyal insists 
that Tibetan identity insecurity should be the underlying cause of the uprising in 2008, and of 
the Tibetan question in general (Topgyal 2011: 186). To what extent do ideas and identity 
matter? Can ideas and identity solve the Tibet Question? This becomes the first point of 
departure of this research paper to explore the validity and critique the constructivist’s view of 
identity. 
 
Apart from these mainstream political traditions, a set of different political thinkers, generally 
coined as critical theorists, for instance, postmodernist, post-structuralist, post-colonialist, and 
feminist, have distinctive views in world politics13. Despite its internal variations, the success 
                                               
12
 For example, Wendt argues that ‘The deep structure of anarchy is cultural or ideational rather than material…there are 
three roles, enemy, rival, and friend,…that are constituted by, and constitute, three distinct macro-level cultures of 
international politics, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, respectively.’ (Wendt 1999: 279-299). 
13
 There are different categorizations for these alternative theories. For example, Devetak differentiates critical theory from 
post-structuralist theory. Some, by contrast, put all of the theories under the rubric ‘critical theory’, representing a range of 
approaches including Marxism and post-Marxism, the Frankfurt School, hermeneutics, phenomenology, post-colonialism, 
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of critical international theory rests, as Devetak puts it, on its ability to offer a more self-
reflective theory than traditional modes of international theory by the ethos of critique and the 
spirit of universal emancipation. Based on these two normative interests, critical international 
theory not only is concerned with providing explanations of the existing realities of world 
politics (as traditional IR theories have been doing), but also intends to criticize them in order 
to transform them (Devetak 1995: 36). Critical theory has gained its prominence in IR. 
Although a few critical theorists have commented on the Tibet Question, the Tibet Question 
debate, this paper argues, is long overdue to engage critical international theories. This 
engagement with critical international theory becomes another point of departure for this 
paper. 
 
Besides English literature, Chinese literature is also emerging in the debate of the Tibet 
Question. The overall picture of Chinese literature on the Tibet Question in response to the 
2008 uprising remains unclear. Most of the Chinese language scholarship stands by the side of 
the CCP against Tibet’s independence and the so-called Western Imperialism, even though 
they often disagree with many other aspects of the CCP’s rule.  As one of the best Tibet 
experts with Han heritage, Wang Li-xiong blatantly points out the intertwined nature of 
China-Tibet relations. The exemplar case in point is the local Tibetans’ involvement in the 
destruction of temples and the denial of their religion during the Cultural Revolution (Wang, 
L 2002: 79). The prominent figure of the Chinese ‘New Left’ academics, Wang Hui, defends 
the institutional design of Chinese’s multi-ethnic state policy14 . He argues that the Tibet 
Question should be understood in three major contexts: the influence of Orientalism, the 
discourses manipulated by some political powers and international organizations, and the 
West’s mixture feelings of anxiety, fear, exclusion, and disapproval towards the rise of non-
liberal China. The voices from these Chinese commentators, no matter how biased they are 
(probably as much as all of the other dominant West commentators), must not be dismissed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
feminism, queer theory, post-structuralism, pragmatism, scientific realism, deconstruction and psychoanalysis (Edkins & 
Vaughan-Williams eds 2009). 
14
 See Wang, Hui. 2008. “Beyond Orientalism and Nationalism” an interview on Utopia. 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class17/200806/40777.html (access on 2/11/2011) 




1.2 The debates 
 
To summarize the field, there are a number of debates discernable in the current literature on 
the Tibet Question. First, the critical question posed for Tibet scholars is how to discuss the 
Tibetan Question without falling into either the West romanticism or Chinese Han ethno-
centricism, either Tibetan nationalism or Chinese nationalism. Most of the pro-Tibet Western 
commentators still dwell on the dichotomy of a sacred Tibet with ‘its unique culture with an 
aura of romantic mystery and spiritual enlightenment’ (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 130) and an 
evil Han Chinese regime. Following this dichotomy, for example, Hoa and Turner’s prospect 
of the future of China-Tibet relations is the emergence of the Chinese tributary state with de 
facto control over Tibet by demographic expansion and occupation by stealth (Hoa and Turner 
2010: 252). Pro-China commentators, by contrast, take a directly oppositional standpoint. Xu 
and Yuan contend that the Tibet Question has roots in British imperial expansion in South 
Asia, and what currently the West, led by the US, has done on the issue of the Tibet Question 
is ‘an insult to the Chinese people, especially to the Han Chinese’ (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 
316). The primary task for Tibet scholars, therefore, is to avoid being trapped into any of the 
current established political discourse represented by national interest. This paper suggests the 
engagement of critical international theory can eventually retrieve the multi-faceted nature of 
the Tibet Question by persistent critique, and point to the possible future of peaceful solution 
by a critical forward looking approach. 
 
Secondly, it is equally important to question what exactly accounts for the development 
problems and rights violation issues in Tibet. One side of the debate maintains that the CCP’s 
autocratic rule is the source of problems, as the development in Tibet and the western region 
(xibu da kaifa) benefits the Hans far more than Tibetans.  Andrew Fisher, for example, argues 
that Tibetans are impoverished while their environment is irreparably damaged under the 
Chinese state development model (Fisher 2002).  Others assert that capitalist globalization 
holds partial responsibility for the social and economic changes of Tibetan society. However 
there are nuanced views in terms of the exact way globalization impacts Tibet. For Dawa 
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Norbu, globalization is taken advantage of by Chinese nationalists to realize the long term 
sacred mission of killing the very idea of Tibetan identity once and for all through 
Sinicization and Stalinist industrial gigantism without the PLA firing a single shot (Sautman 
& Dreyer 2006: 163). 
 
For Hu and Salazar, by contrast, the ethnic conflict in Tibet is closely linked to the cross-
regional and cross-ethnic migration driven by the urbanization and industrialization in China, 
through the swift penetration of the market to ethnic minority regions (Hu & Salazar: 2008: 1-
21). They argue that social conflict in Tibet is comparable to what happens in China’s 
booming industrial coastal regions, where the social tensions come primarily from the 
urban/rural development disparity. The PRC alone is not the only source of problems for 
Tibet. The Tibet Question must be read in the context of globalization. To locate Tibet’s 
position of its development and future, we should look at Tibet and China in the context of 
globalization. The Tibet Question is not merely between Tibet and China, but is more and 
more interdependent on and interrelating to the rest of the world, economic and politically.  
 
The third important question is how to resolve the identity conundrum of Tibet. The Tibet 
Question is often framed in the language of the ‘clash of civilization’. Clearly culture and 
identity are at the forefront of the debate.  Liberal constructivism maintains that national 
identity is socially and historically constructed. Liberals’ affirmative recognition, 
multiculturalism, as Will Kymlicka argues, is able to defend political policies aimed at 
ensuring the ‘survival’ or ‘autonomy’ of minority cultures (Kymlicka 1996: 4). However, 
liberals assume that it is still possible to sharply demarcate ‘distinctive societies’ or ‘societal 
cultures’ from one another. It is argued that one can uncontroversially distinguish the practices 
and beliefs that are intrinsic to a culture from those that are inauthentic or extrinsic (Fraser & 
Honneth 2003: 104). A large amount of the literature on Tibet politics falls into these liberal 
constructivist paradigms. 
 
Critical theorists, however, tend to be skeptical about the simplistic notion of identity politics. 
Feminists contend that usually misrecognition is interpreted as depreciated identity, and the 
politics of recognition means identity politics, aimed at affirming a given group identity, but 
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that interpretation is problematic, as it reifies identities, encourages separatism, and masks 
intra-group domination (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Moreover, critical theorists tend to 
contemplate more on the need for normative thinking, i.e. how to build a fair community and 
achieve political emancipation. 
 
There are so many differing ways to look at the Tibet Question. While it is impossible to 
address every single aspect of the Tibet Question, this research paper nonetheless focuses on 
how identity politics plays out in China-Tibet relations. As Sautman and Dreyer put it the 
conflict over Tibet has above all been about its political status (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 3). 
However, to look at the Tibet Question through the lens of identity is by no means to overlook 
other critical factors, such as material, economic, institutional, and international actors. 
Rather, this paper attempts to include most of those critical factors within the discussion of 
the identity discourse. Through the platform of the salient identity discourse, this research 
paper paradoxically seeks to move beyond the identity politics, and argue that the future 
community building for both Tibet and China should be based on the recognition of the open 
and contingent identities of the multitude by demolishing the clear cut national identity. 
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“There is an expectation of a meaning, a substance, that is at once produced and 
thwarted by the formal act of positing. The identity that the name confers turns out 
to be empty, and this insight into its emptiness produced a critical position on the 
naturalizing effects of this naming process.” (Butler 2000: 28) 
 
This chapter explores how national identity is theorized divergently by political thinkers, 
particularly highlighting the debate between essentialism and constructivism. Drawing on the 
work from some of the critical theorists, this chapter points to the problematic notion of a 
collective identity, and argues that it is social power and discourse that make national identity 
seem like this.  
 
2.1 Identity debate: Essentialism and Constructivism 
 
The public discourse of nation is often compelling: ‘Chinese nation with 5000-year history of 
splendid hua culture’; ‘The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham, and 
Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity’.15 Nationalism is not just 
a delusion in people’s everyday life intensified by mass media. Nationalism, for many, 
becomes values that are worth defending, even dying for. At some point, 77 percent of 
Americans in one survey say they would be willing to fight in a war for their country 
(Mathews 2000: 7). Most Mainland Chinese would agree to achieve national unity through a 
military option (Chow 2008: 11-12). 
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 Speech by the Dalai Lama: http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/statement-of-his-holiness (access on 01/02/2012). 
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Nation and national identity as political concepts are notoriously difficult to define and 
analyse. Is nation real? Are there any inherently static elements that the individual can refer to 
at a personal level? The answers to these questions are the key to the resolution of the Tibet 
Question. There are four mainstream social theories that approach national identity formation 
from different perspectives, namely essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism, and 
institutionalism. It is generally believed that pure essentialism does not exist any more, and 
constructivism is the conventional wisdom on national identity formation (Varshney 2009: 
285). After decades of scholarly debate, it is now almost a consensus to say nation and 
national identity are socially constructed, rather than natural and pre-given. But what does it 
mean to say they are ‘socially constructed’? 
 
Both Anderson and Smith highlight culture as the root of a nation. For Anderson, nations are 
‘imagined communities’, and are constructed through the development of printing press and 
capitalism, and the spread of vernacular language necessitated by the state. However, he 
concedes that nation or nationalism has to be understood by aligning it with ‘cultural roots’, 
or ‘the large cultural systems that precede it’ (Anderson 2006: 12). For Smith, modern nations 
are reconstructed on the basis of pre-modern ethnic communities - ethnie. He argues that no 
matter how revolutionary industrial capitalism and modernity has been working on nation’s 
formation, the origins of nations, in his words, ‘many of the cultures and identities formed in 
pre-modern eras’ and their ‘internal properties’, remain traceable and important to every 
nation-ness today (Smith 1986: 3). In a similar vein, Laitin sees that nation is a product of 
cultural coordination and the claim to statehood or political autonomy for the population that 
successfully coordinates (Laintin 2007: 41). Guibernau defines national identity as a 
collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing 
most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations (Guibernau 2007: 11). 
 
For many social constructivists nation and national identity are socially constructed rather 
than natural and pre-given. And yet, when they try to trace back further historically and probe 
down deeper analytically, there is still always something at the core, either culture or internal 
properties, that is stubbornly sticky and is impossible to obliterate under the name of national 
identity. Despite the differences of their focuses and variants of their arguments, recent 
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mainstream constructivist literature more or less agrees on the ‘Janus-facedness’ of national 
identity – the two components of national identity: one is real, given; and the other is 
constructed, or negotiated (Laitin 1998: 20). Laitin argues that one face of national identity is 
based on cultural foundations such as shared symbols that provide people of a cultural group a 
common world view and a shared vision of what is worth fighting for. The other face is based 
on people’s strategic coordination that makes culture seem stable, yet open to rapid shifts in 
cultural identification (Laitin 2007: viii). Framing in this way, national identity, in Laitin’s 
words, is sailing between the Scylla of primordialists and the Charybdis of instrumentalists. 
 
Of the two faces, the strategic face of national identity is used to address the difference or the 
otherness, and is closely bound up to individual’s strategic choice as an autonomous agent. 
This issue on individual identity choice is beyond the scope of this paper16. The cultural face 
of national identity, in contrast, is identical to Anderson and Smith’s ‘cultural root’ argument, 
and is tied to the ‘cultural foundation’. Is this foundation pre-given and constructed? The 
answer to this would probably distinguish a good constructivist from a primordialist. But how 
can constructivists escape foundationalism (Smith 1995: 29)17 if they premise their argument 
on this cultural foundation? This is perhaps one of the paradoxes that constructivists are yet to 
resolve. 
 
The discussion of cultural foundation leads to the two sides of identification: sameness and 
difference. Jenkins insists that the importance of identity hinges on the interplay of similarity 
and difference (Jenkins 2008: 16-27). On the one hand, the recognition of ‘us’ is also 
dependent upon with whom we have things ‘in common’. He uses the word ‘similarity’, 
things ‘in common’, not sameness, to sail away from essentialism. On the other hand, the 
recognition of ‘us’ is dependent upon our not being ‘them’, or to say ‘who I am’ is to say 
‘who or what I am not’. Few would question the ‘difference’ side of identity. Therefore, it is 
clear now that the debate of a national identity is always caught up in the difficult issue of 
how much sameness we share, under the name of ‘our’ identity.  
 
                                               
16
 For more detailed discussion about the individual identity choice and agency, see Laitin (2007), Butler (1997, 2005). 
17
 See Smith (1995) review of international relations theories. He highlights the debate between foundationalist and anti-
foundationalist. Foundationalism, for Smith, is the ways in which a theory serves as a neutral arbiter, representing the truth. 
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2.2 Beyond identity: a critical approach 
 
To tackle this difficulty of the sameness, critical theory, especially feminist’s identity theory, 
may cast new light on the myth of nation and the sameness of national identity. Feminist’s 
theory, particularly Butler’s work for this paper, has been influential in critiques of gender 
identity, politics of state violence, and mourning, but it has not yet been used adequately to 
look at national identity critically. There are two fundamental principles from Butler’s work 
that differentiate her politics from mainstream constructivist: for one, there is no intrinsic 
foundation for any collective identity; for another, the salience of identity is the result of the 
operation of social power and discourse, which makes collective identity seem natural. 
 
In her scholarly founding text Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 
Butler challenges the pervasive notion in social science that sex is biologically pre-existing, 
whilst gender is socially constructed. She argues that sex is already the bodily effect of 
gender, where the body materialises through regulatory gendered regimes of 
power/knowledge, or in her words, the heteronormativity (Butler 1990: 7, 35). Butler 
fundamentally challenges this nature and culture relation and ultimately the very concept of 
identity. Moreover, Butler argues that ‘woman’ is not a singular and sustainable identity. 
Feminism becomes an identity politics if it assumes ‘woman’ as a singular category. 
Reflecting on the troubled disputes between different strands of feminists, such as European 
feminist, African-American feminist, and lesbian feminist, Butler asks ‘how is it that the very 
category, the subject, the we, that is supposed to be presumed for the purpose of solidarity, 
produces the very factionalization it is supposed to quell?’ (Butler 1992: 14). 
 
There is a fundamental problem of exclusiveness inherently in the name of identity. The 
notion of identity is able to furnish the focal point for collective action, as the feminist slogan 
‘sisterhood is powerful’ suggests. However, an identity assumes a collective subject that 
represents what ‘we’ are, and inevitably sets firm boundaries against the others. Butler asserts 
that identity functions so as to exclude those who fail to fit with its ‘descriptivist ideal’ (Butler 
1993: 221). The Israeli state cannot gain its legitimacy without an identity of Jewishness 
based on some shared characteristics and a shared history of perceived oppression. Mainland 
China’s firm policy on the Tibet Question is premised on an ethnic nationalist sense of 
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Chineseness. The central problem of national identity, as Iris Young points out, is that the 
‘merely different’ is turned into the ‘absolute other’ (Llord 2005: 38).  
 
Beside the problem of exclusiveness, an identity can never equate sameness. It has become a 
well-received view that women are no longer a unitary and homogenous group. There is vast 
diversity in ‘women’, rather than a singular ‘woman’. Women do not share any essential 
connection with one another through the fact of simply being female. In a broader 
perspective, identity politics, apprehended as the proclamation of some form of homogeneity 
among gender, race, nationality, is not simply an attempt to describe certain crucial 
characteristics or an authentic subjective experience, it is inherently prescriptive and 
normalizing. Following Butler’s logics of the denaturalization and destabilization of identity, 
this paper argues that what we think of nation makes the nation. This is the key component 
that functions to make the nation seem like it is. Precisely because there are too many origins 
of nation, there is no origin for nation, be it ethnie or culture. What we think, or what 
discourse makes us think, is the origin of nation.  
 
 
Echoing Butler, Brubaker casts doubt on identity. He insists that ethnic groups, as he believes 
they are generally conceptualised within social science as clearly bounded, internally fairly 
homogenous and distinguished from other groups of the same kind, are not real. What is real 
is a shared sense of ‘groupness’, of group membership. Brubaker goes on and argues that 
identity in general is not a thing that people can be said to have, or that they can be; thus it is 
not real either. (Brubaker 2004: 7-27, quoted in Jenkins 2008: 8). There is an underlying 
assumption that nation is built on real things, such as national territory, languages, population, 
race, ethnicity; while nationalism is an ideology, such as ideas, norms. Following Brubaker’s 
logic, this paper argues that nation is not real, only the ideologies of nationalism are real. It is 
the public discourse of grouping that rounds-up and invents the boundaries, and consequently 
the groups themselves. 
 
China is often normalized as a historically old and culturally rich nation in the Communist 
regime. Yujiro’s study shows that the history of China as a continuum beyond different 
dynasties and ethnic groups is never sustainable. He argues that ‘China’ as the name of the 
Chapter 2. Theorizing the identity debate 
25 
country is only a recent invention in the late nineteenth century (Yujiro 2001: 357-369). It was 
born for the necessity of forging a uniform national identity and national culture to form a 
new state to succeed the Qing dynasty in front of modern foreign powers. It was at that 
moment that race/ethnicity was nationalised. Even the majority ethnicity of Han was not a 
genuine or pure race since new blood had been added to it since ancient times. Nor is there 
anything inherently static in the Tibetan identity. Tibet and Tibetan identity has been 
historically invented by The West, China, and Tibetans themselves, in exile or in diaspora. 
The next chapter will examine these processes of historical invention in detail. 
 
The ‘Janus-facedness’ of national identity is premised on a cultural foundation while keeping 
its distance from primordialism. Here, whether it is constructed or not, has become irrelevant. 
The means they use of pointing to the cultural foundations, the sameness, for critical theorists, 
is already primordialist. The prominent scholar, Huntington, calling for the preservation of the 
American national identity in the wake of 9/11, is a good example (Huntington 2004). 
Although it is believed that pure essentialism is dead, it is arguable that the essential or 
foundational ‘face’ of nation is still haunting social constructivists. Therefore, to argue against 
essentialism today is not entirely a ‘straw man’ or beating the dead horse. 
 
Moreover, one cannot deny that many constructivists’ argument is based on a paradigm that is 
precisely built on the dichotomies of nature/culture, biological/social, ethnie/nation, 
object/subject. The difficulty for social construction is that this real, given ‘national 
foundation’ thing, be it culture, ethnie, or race, is as hard to define as nation itself. For 
instance, not many constructivists would dispute that a British person is intrinsically different 
from a black African or a Chinese person because of their distinct ‘internal properties’, even 
though they believe each nationality is socially constructed. Lloyd blatantly points out that the 
opposition between essentialism and constructivism is itself unsustainable, and that 
constructivism is simply a more sophisticated form of essentialism’ (Lloyd 2005: 57). Despite 
its problematic treatment of constructivists as a homogeneous group, Lloyd’s claim has its 
validity. It sums up in a simplified way how critical theorists disagree with some of the 
constructivists. 
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To sum up, whether there is origin or foundation for national identity is an important point for 
the discussion of Tibetan nationhood. This question directly ties to the query of whether 
national identity is negotiated, adopted, or simply rediscovered by the people. If there is no 
intrinsic sameness at all in national identity, then perhaps it does not seem right to 
‘rediscover’ one’s national roots in oneself for the sake of freedom and autonomy as a 
sovereign subject. If, following Butler, national identity is an ontologically empty thing, what 
is the force that draws individuals towards this empty identity?  
 
2.3 How does collective identity come to seem like this 
 
If there is no origin and sameness that we can point to in our national identity, why does it 
seem so natural that everyone has a nationality, or should eventually have one if not yet? Why 
do people believe in nation-ness, from Westerners securely feel their ‘belonging’ to liberal 
First-world national identities, to subaltern post-colonial Third-world people’s fervent 
‘rediscovery’ of their lost national roots? Butler, following Foucault, turns to the theories of 
discourse and power18 to explain collective identity formation. 
 
Social constructivists, most of them, already see power relations in national identity 
formation. For instance, discourses of national identity are discourses of power (Hogan 2009: 
11). Constructivists have argued how languages and symbols, as the basic forms of discourse, 
play an important role in identity formation. In Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’, the role 
of language, as a vehicle of discourse, plays a central role. The origins of nations are said to 
lie with the emergence of ‘popular vernacular nationalism’ at the point where printed 
languages replace visual images and symbols as the main means of holding large populations 
together (Anderson 1983: 29). Laitin pays attention to two crucial roles of language: first, the 
‘mother tongue’ as national membership, second, the ‘general will’19  aspect of language 
(Laitin 2007: 31). 
 
                                               
18
 Discourse and power are conceived in highly theoretical and abstract manner in Foucault and Butler’s work. This paper, 
however, discusses discourse and power mostly in a general social and historical sense. 
19
 See Laitin 2007: 31, he argues, when Russian speaking is the general will or national culture, non-Russian speakers would 
gain if they switched to learn Russian. In fact, it is to everyone’s benefit to coordinate. 
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Billig, however, contends that language does not create nationalism, so much as nationalism 
creates language. While nations may be imagined communities, the patterning of the 
imaginings cannot be explained in terms of differences of language, for languages themselves 
may have to be imagined as distinct entities (Billig 1995: 30, 36). Cohen insists symbols of 
community are constructed, and their significance is far from self-evident, or immutable. It is 
not the mere word ‘nation’ which triggers a response among people, but the accumulated 
wealth of meanings and associations it has come to represent (Day and Thompson 2004: 97). 
 
Interestingly, the notion of ‘imagined communities’ by constructivists is quite close to 
Butler’s ‘psychic life of power’ (Butler 1997)20 in two ways. For one, national identity is 
socially constructed, by and large, in the form of discursive discourse. For another, national 
identity is imagined cognitively at the individual level. Butler’s work on power and discourse 
is derived from Foucault’s genealogical approach to social phenomenon. On the one hand, 
genealogy is predicated on a rejection of linear theories of historical development. What is 
discourse? For Foucault, discourse is constructed through the process of discursive formation. 
Discourse, Foucault argues, never consists of one statement, one text, one action or one 
source. Discourse takes place, as forms of events, across a range of texts, and as forms of 
conduct, at a number of different institutional sites within society (Hall 2001: 73). Following 
Foucault, Butler employs a genealogical critique that investigates ‘the political stakes in 
designating as an origin and cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of 
institutions, practices, discourses’ (Butler, 1990: ix). 
 
On the other hand, Foucault and Butler turn to examine the power relations by the tool of 
discourse analysis. They attempt to repudiate the search for the origins of specific historical 
phenomenon. Rather, for Foucault and Butler, power becomes an apparatus consisting of 
laws, discourses, institutions, ideas, and decisions that connect in various complex, mutable, 
open-ended, and importantly, confrontational, ways (Foucault 1980: 194). Bio-power, as 
Foucault terms it, emerges with two sets of techniques: those for population control 
(demography, public health, housing, migration), and those of discipline (schools, hospitals, 
                                               
20
 For Butler, the psychic life is the ‘inner life’ of consciouness and uncousciousness. This psychic life is generated by the 
social operation of power. The central theme of her book ‘The Psychic Life of Power’ is about the way in which psychic life 
is generated by the social operation of power, and how that social operation of power is concealed and fortified by the psyche 
that it produced. 
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factories, army). Together they generate a ‘form of concrete arrangement’ or ‘global strategy’ 
(Foucault 1978: 140). 
 
The conceptions of discourse and power provide a solid foundation for Butler’s theorization 
of how the state makes the nation. Butler sees that there is certain correspondence existing 
between the state and the nation. Butler argues that those modes of national belonging 
designated by ‘the nation’ are thoroughly stipulative and criterial: one is not simply dropped 
from the nation; rather, one is found to be wanting and so, becomes a ‘wanting one’ through 
the designation and its implicit and active criteria (Butler 2007: 30-31). Moreover, the nation-
state is inevitably bound up with the recurrent expulsion of national minorities. Butler asserts 
that the nation-state assumes that the nation expresses a singular and homogeneous national 
identity to comply with the requirements of the state. The state derives its legitimacy from the 
nation, which means that those national minorities who do not qualify for ‘national belonging’ 
are regarded as ‘illegitimate’ inhabitants.  
 
The following chapter will discuss how identity plays out in nation / state building for China 
and Tibet by engaging mainly constructivist and critical theorist’s political theory. Drawing on 
critical theory, mostly poststructualist, feminist, and postcolonialist’s writing, the following 
chapter will show there is nothing static, coherent, and natural about the national identity for 
either China or Tibet, and how contested and unsustainable a collective identity is, and how 
failing it is as the principle of community building. 
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From India to Algeria and Cuba to Vietnam, the state is the poisoned gift of national 
liberation. (Hardt & Negri 2000: 134) 
 
This chapter explores the nature of national identity in both China and Tibet, and how it is 
constructed and contested. The Tibet Question is primarily about the conflictual 
identifications between China and Tibet. Tibet’s nationalistic movement is immediately tied 
up with China’s own national imagination21. Thus, the discussion of China’s nationalism in 
the first section becomes the logical starting point of the identity dispute between China and 
Tibet. The second section examines in detail the complex and discursive construction of 
Tibet’s national identity through the identity content and contestation framework. And the last 
section explores the problematics of the Tibetan identity, by focusing on the hegemonic and 
contested nature of the Tibetan identity and in fact any collective identity. 
 
3.1 Nationalism and sub-state nationalism in PRC 
 
National identity is notoriously hard to define, let alone to analyse in practice. Perhaps it is 
more appropriate, as Jenkins suggests, to unpack the processes of this identification (Jenkins 
2006: 15). The rise of Chinese power has attracted much scholarly interest on Chinese 
national identity and Chinese nationalism. Culturalists have long been dominant in the field. 
They tend to base their argument on China’s culture and history, as well as its humiliation 
experience with the West (Johnston 1996: 218; Zheng 1999: 17). Recently, different views 
                                               
21
 There are certainly different types of nationalism, such as, ethnic nationalism, liberal nationalism, civic nationalism etc. 
For more detail discussion, see Day. G & Thompson, A. (2004). Theorizing Nationalism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. In 
any case, both the Chinese and Tibetan nationalism more fit in the ethnic nationalism. It is, however, important to point out 
that critical theorist, especially Butler, is in general sceptical about any form of nationalism. 
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arise in the literature, which discuss Chinese national identity and nationalism in a more 
contextual manner, and start to include more institutional analysis (Guang 2005: 487-514; 
Callahan 2004; Carlson 200922). These context-embedded discussions of Chinese identity, this 
paper suggests, have begun to move beyond traditional essentialist view of a China in a ‘black 
box’, and take on the task of unpacking the vast and heterogeneous subject of the Chinese 
nation. The section briefly examines how state institutions define and limit identity politics in 
PRC. Despite Beijing’s ongoing attempts to formulate a singular definition of Chinese 
national identity, political scientists have demonstrated the multi-faceted and contested nature 
of the Chinese nation. 
 
It is almost a truism today to say that national identity is socially constructed. It is, however, 
particularly true when it comes to a vast country like China. Prominent Sinologist Wang 
explains the concept ‘Chineseness’ in terms of the nature of being China, or the nature of 
being someone Chinese (Wang 2009: 201). The concept of a Chinese nation, in fact, is a very 
recent construct. According to Yojiro, ‘minzu’ is a close concept to nation in Chinese 
language, which was introduced from Meiji Japan to late Qing China, and it was more 
identified with race (Yujiro 2001: 366). The first wave of nationalism in China arose during 
the ethnic tension between Manchu and Han. In 1911 when the Republic of China was born, a 
Chinese nation was invented by Sun Yat-sen as a natural and voluntary community of people. 
Under Sun’s conception, all of the non-Han ‘races’ were now Chinese too. Yujiro argues that 
the notion of a Chinese nation was used by Sun as a concept with nationalised race/ethnicity 
for the necessity and purposes of unification of the newly formed state.  
 
The nation of China is never a singular and coherent subject if we take it from a 
deconstruction point of view. According to historians, there was ‘division of five races’ back 
in the early 1900s, namely Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur, and Tibetan. Since the 
establishment of PRC, there are officially recognised 56 ethnicities. Meanwhile, many 
scholars start to challenge the notion of Chineseness as a national identity and argue that the 
involuntarily and ubiquitously usage of the term is based on a historical construct and that 
                                               
22
 Carlson points to three major flaws in the study of Chinese nationalism and advocates a turn to the broader question of 
national identity formation. See Carlson 2009. “A Flawed Perspective: the Limitations inherent within the study of Chinese 
nationalism” Nations and Nationalism 15(1): 20-35. 
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possibly there is not much inherent essence in that ‘identity’ (Yojiro 2001; Reid 2009; Wang 
Gungwu 2009).  
 
The state plays a central role during the processes of identity formation. During the state-
building time, elites sought to overlay nation and state to gain mass identification with their 
particular program to obtain political authority over the nation. The primary tool used by the 
state is the political system. Stockton asserts that the process of national identity construction 
is a political struggle by a ruling power to implement an agenda to ensure self-rule and civic 
or cultural allegiance to the state (Stockton 2008: 101). Since the establishment as a one-party 
state, PRC has been inevitably engaging with largely non-liberal forms of national identity 
construction, with the goal of elites consolidating their political dominance over a society, 
discouraging or even suppressing political pluralism.  
 
Above all, political control is the primary form of national identity construction by the CCP. 
After generations of struggles in political power and attempts of political reforms, under the 
rule of Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu, the CCP monopoly remains intact. Pei makes a strong case 
arguing that the political reform is far from sufficient for sustainable economic development 
in the PRC (Pei 2006). According to Pei, despite all the institutional reforms in the political 
system, such as mandatory retirement of government officials, the strengthening of the 
National People’s Congress, legal reform, experiments in village election, the ruling CCP 
continues to wield enormous authority in every single aspect of political life, from lawmaking 
to administrative bureaucracy, from elections to policy making. The post-Tiananmen era even 
sees the tightening of the CCP central rule.  
 
National identity formation is always linked to the political hegemony and legitimacy of the 
state. This is particularly true in the PRC. The CCP always insists that local concerns must 
give way to party-defined national interests and ideals, and it has the power and capacity to 
ensure this. The CCP enforces local responsiveness to central commands through its system 
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of appointments, the nomenklatura system 23 . The party’s Central Committee controls 
appointments, promotion, and removal of government and party officials at all levels. 
National identity is framed and shaped from top to bottom by the CCP. Free-flowing ideas 
thus are kept at a minimum. Callahan asserts that in Beijing’s discourse, the nation-state is 
naturalized as the sole legitimate political community, and the unity of the Chinese nation is 
taken for granted as its natural state (Callahan 2004: 189). 
 
Secondly, economic development and the free market penetration usually bring about freedom 
of identity expression. From the start of the ‘reform and open’ policy by Deng, until 1989, 
there appeared some degree of free public discussion of politics and cultures. The voices and 
practices of ethnic groups, clans, local communities emerged and called into question of the 
national identity: what is it being a Chinese, and who defines it? Parris’ case study of 
Wenzhou local identity, and the southern coastal region more generally, shows the rise and 
fall of localism vis-à-vis CCP’s central control (Hoover et al. 1997: 123-146). Prominent 
Tibetologist Shakya points out that the protests in the late 1980’s was partly caused by Hu 
Yaobang’s liberal policies, which led to free debate about the Tibetan identity (Shakya 2008: 
7-8). One side turned strongly to Tibetan tradition, religion, and indigenous culture that they 
were denied during the Cultural Revolution; the other side, mainly young university-educated 
people, attempted to modernize the Tibetan identity with an indigenous critique of the Tibetan 
past.  Wenzhou and Tibetan local identities certainly have not succeeded under the CCP’s rule 
in the end. Nor has the localism become the catalyst of civic pluralism in Mainland China. 
 
Localism or Nativism, as in the case of Wenzhou and Tibet, often is the threshold leading to 
cultural and political pluralism. Lai’s comparative study between the xiangtu nativism of 
Taiwan in the 1970s and xungen nativism of the PRC in the 1980s, explains why it succeeded 
in Taiwan and failed in PRC (Lai 2008: 159). Lai argues that the party-state in PRC actively 
promoted a market economy in the 1990s in order to disarm and neutralize the discontent of 
the populace over the 1989 brutal suppression at Tiananmen Square. The fervent promotion of 
a market economy fosters the full-blown development of mass consumerism, which 
                                               
23
 See Burn’s description: ‘the nomenklatura system consists of lists of leading positions over which party committees 
exercise the power of appointment, lists of reserve cadre for the available positions, and the institutions and processes for 
making the appropriate personnel changes’ (Burns 1987: 36, quoted in Huang 2009). 
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ultimately engulfs xungen nativism (the reference to a ‘native’ realm of moral values and 
idealistic adherence to tradition-based individual principles) and makes it irrelevant and 
obsolete. In a similar vein, Ci describes the PRC’s turn from communist regime to market 
economy as a morally catastrophic shift from Utopianism to Hedonism (Ci 1994). Economic 
reform alone is clearly insufficient for the establishment of cultural and political pluralism in 
the PRC. 
 
Thirdly, the education system is another key institution for identity construction under state 
power. In the PRC, education is reduced to be the propaganda of the CCP at the service of the 
anti-imperialist nationalism. In school, teachers are forced to tell the story again and again to 
young students that the PRC is the heir of a Han people who had come together millennia 
earlier in the north China plain of the yellow river valley, built a great civilization, fought to 
preserve it, and expanded over the centuries by civilizing barbarian invaders (Blum & Jensen 
2002: 32-33). Cultural institutions, such as museums, monuments, and other cultural 
antiquities in the PRC displayed the nationalist history with a singular north China origin to 
Chinese civilization, and as an ascent from Peking man through an expansionist, 
amalgamating, and unifying Han culture to the founding of the People’s Republic. 
 
Scholars, however, casts doubt on this monolithic rendition of national history. Friedman’s 
study shows that China was a rich amalgam of influences from many areas ever since the late 
Neolithic and Bronze Age (Friedman 2002: 31-44). According to Chinese archaeologists’ 
founding, the genesis of China’s civilization was multi-linear and came not from one source, 
but from many. Moreover, Friedman uses the examples of Chu culture (now hu’nan) and 
Yue/Cantonese culture (now guangdong) in South China, to argue that southern Chinese 
derive pride and identity from other cultural markers rather than the national narrative of a 
northern ‘cradle’ of civilization. 
 
Fourthly, the ethnic identities within the PRC are largely the products of the state’s ethnic 
policy. Mullaney’s extensive research convincingly shows that the idea of China as a ‘unified, 
multinational country’ (tongyi de duo minzu guojia) is a central load-bearing concept within a 
wide and heterogeneous array of discourses and practices in China (Mullaney 2010). As early 
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as in Qing, gazetteerists reported to the imperial centre that the Yun’nan province alone was 
home to over one hundred distinct peoples, with nearly one hundred more in the neibouring 
province of Guizhou. Only a few decades later, however, Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist 
regime proclaimed that the country belongs to only one people, ‘the Chinese People’ 
(zhonghua minzu) to gain the legitimacy of rule. The early communists, along with many 
Chinese scholars, counter argued against Chiang’s mono-national China, with the newly 
introduced Western concept ‘nation’ (minzu). Following the revolution of 1949, the 
ethnotaxonomic volatility persists. In the first census of the PRC, between 1953 and 1954, 
officials tabulated over four hundred different responses to the question of minzu identity. 
This deluge came in response to the Communist Party’s promise of ethnonational equality, 
which entailed a commitment to recognizing the existence of ethnonational diversity to a 
greater extent than their predecessors had ever been willing to do. Over the course of the 
subsequent three decades, however, only fifty-five of these were officially recognized, which 
entailed a remarkable level of categorical compression: from four hundred potential 
categories of minzu identity to under sixty, sanctioned by the state. There are some degrees of 
good intention in the CCP’s early ethnic policy. There are, however, unintended effects as 
well. 
 
Anthropologist David Wu’s study shows, in the case of Bai (an ethnic minority artificially 
named in PRC), how the government policies of advancing a minority group’s social status 
and the minority’s acknowledgement of its new status have had a profound effect on ethnic 
identity in China (Wu 2002: 170). The naming and framing of ethnic minority groups in the 
PRC continue to serve the purposes of putting the Han Chinese at the centre with the 
‘barbarians’ at the frontier, and effectively become part of the CCP’s grand strategy of 
building a harmonious society with multi-ethnicities. Wu argues that the Chinese people and 
Chinese culture have been constantly amalgamating, restructuring, reinventing, and 
reinterpreting themselves. The seemingly static Chinese culture has been in a continuous 
process of assigning important new meanings about being Chinese. Indeed, state, particularly 
cultural and ethnic institutions, such as the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, have had a 
great deal of power during the process. And what makes it worse is that there is hardly any 
public debate or private expression on ethnic or local identities under the CCP’s regime. 
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Last, but not the least, Chinese nation building is accompanied with the consistent exclusion 
or separation of religion from the state. The CCP policies towards religious groups were 
essentially based on Marxist ideology. In China, it means a mixture of Chinese agnosticism, 
Han nationalism, and Marxism. Marxist philosophy maintains, ‘Religion is the sign of the 
oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world,…it is the opium of the people. The 
abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness’ 
(Mukherjee 2010). This state ideology determines that the CCP’s policies towards religious 
groups are generally in line with anti-religious traditions and repressing religious 
organizations.  
 
The central Committee of the CCP clearly stated, ‘religion had its own cycle of emergence, 
development and demise and religion will soon disappear from human history naturally only 
through the long term development of Socialism and Communism, when all objective 
requirements are met’. It also stresses, ‘We communists are atheists and must unremittingly 
propagate atheism and yet at the same time we must understand that it will be fruitless and 
extremely harmful to use simple coercion in dealing with people’s ideological and spiritual 
questions and this includes religious questions’ (Mukherjee 2010: 469). In practice, religious 
groups enjoyed religious freedom only if they spoke in line with the propaganda of the party. 
Intransigent or independent religious leaders were singled out, harassed, publicly denounced, 
and removed from office. Above all, religious believers would have to root out all counter 
revolutionary activity or ‘feudal reactionary poisonous weeds hiding under the cloak of 
religion’.  
 
The above discussion shows that state and political institutions have a remarkable impact on 
identity. State does not constitute identity, except in extreme cases (totalitarian regimes – 
Nazi, Mao, or in Orwell’s 1984). The state, however, can reinforce and influence identity 
markers (ethnic, cultural, religious ones) by state mechanisms and policymaking. Hoover et 
al. argue that the state cannot provide an identity to its citizens, but it can displace internal 
processes of maturation and growth by substituting identity foreclosure, as in colonialism, the 
replication of stereotypes, as in nationalism, and the resulting negative identities for ‘aliens, 
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foreigners, and even natives’ (Hoover et al. 1997: 40). Culture or identity is not in itself, and 
of itself, decisive, while the state is able to decide among numerous contending regional or 
cultural narratives. The political landscape rightly reflects the reason why the public 
discussion of plural identities remains stagnant within the PRC. 
 
To sum up this section, the monolithic political system in the PRC clearly leads to the 
Monism of national identity discourse and what counts as Chinese. And this, in turn, is at the 
service of the legitimatization of the CCP’s rule in Mainland China. There is a tension in the 
Chinese identity construct in the PRC: an inclination to authoritarian collectivistic nationalism 
in Beijing leads to a centripetal24 national identity building; on the other hand, this centralized 
identity construct does little justice to the diverse historical and social reality within the vast 
territories and heterogeneous populations. This tension between the highly centralized 
institutions and vastly diverse sociality has a tendency to foster regional ethnic conflicts once 
the centre collapses, as witnessed in post-communist Russia25. 
 
3.2 National identity and Tibet 
 
The Chinese national identity is by no means a singular and homogeneous entity, as discussed 
in the last section. Nor is the identity of Tibet inherently natural, static, or uncontaminated 
vis-à-vis the Chinese one. What is Tibet? What makes Tibet distinctively a nation? Who is 
Tibetan? What makes Tibetan distinctively different from others such as Chinese? Despite this 
vastly increased and broad-ranging interest in ‘identity’, the concept itself remains something 
of an enigma (Fearon 1999: 3). At the same time ‘identity’ has, however, become a key term 
in the vernacular idiom of contemporary politics (Brubaker 2000: 2). This contradiction is 
particularly true in the debate of the Tibet Question. This section examines the discursive and 
contested construction of the Tibetan identity. Why are the authorities of China and Tibet able 
to construct a completely different Tibetan identity based on an opposite account of Tibetan 
history? Where has this Tibet Question come from? 
                                               
24 See McCrone’s camparison of national identity between Britain and France. McCrone, D. 2002. “Who do you say you 
are?” Ethnicities 2(3): 301-320. He describes national identity construction in France is centripetal. 
25 See Laitin’s study of ethnic conflict and violence in Russia. Laitin. 1998. Identity in Formation. New York: Cornell 
University Press.  
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The disputed history of Tibet 
History is long and complex for Tibet, as well as China (Figure 3.1). And we tend to forget 
that China and Tibet, as political subjects, their ontological meanings and the substance are 
never static, and keep evolving over time. This, in turn, further complicates the already 
disputed relationship. 
 
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Tibetan Histroy (Courtesy of Fisher, 2011) 
 
Earliest diplomatic relations can be traced back to the seventh to the ninth century when Tibet 
was considered a ‘unified’ empire under King Songtsen Gampo, and even Tang China had to 
pay tribute to Tibet. Some argue that during the imperial period, China and Tibet were two 
distinct and separate states. This view is problematic because the political organization back 
then is clearly different from the notion of modern state originated from Europe.  History 
narratives are never consensual. Not only the interpretation of history is disputed, but also the 
elements of history are taken advantage of by political power to construct their version of 
history, truth, and particularly their seemingly natural and inherited collective identity by 
selectively drawing on events, heroes, symbols, and other cultural markers. The manner of 
how the CCP contextualizes its claim of Tibet in its own narrative of history postulates that 
neighboring states and peoples, that China has conquered and assimilated, have been actors in 
an inexorable historical process that destined them to be  ‘integral parts of China,’ incapable 
of true nationhood on their own (Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 12). It is equally true that the 
Tibetan authority constructs the narratives of its own version of history and naturalizes the 
nationhood of Tibet as if it was a pre-existing and pre-given geographical and political entity. 
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One of the biggest disputes, for instance, is Tibet’s political status after the collapse of the 
Qing. The claim by the TGIE and some western commentators is that Tibet was independent 
from 1912 to 1951. They argue that when Qing was expulsed after the revolution in 1911, 
Tibet declared ‘independence’. However, the PRC claims that many provinces also declared 
‘independence’ in China as an end of the Qing’s rule rather than the establishment of a new 
nation. In 1919, the then Dalai Lama in receiving a delegation of the national patriotic and 
anti-imperialist May 4th Movement declared that ‘he had never established good terms with 
Britain and…had never had any intention of separating Tibet from China’ (Blondeau & 
Buffetrille 2008: 39-40). Mukherjee, in contrast, argues that the simple reality of the 
installation of the 14th Dalai Lama needed the approval of the national government is 
sufficient proof that Tibet did not possess any independent sovereignty during that period 
(Mukherjee 2010). Nonetheless, historians have showed the Tibetan status vis-à-vis China is 
between tribute state and suzerain state, and varied from time to time. Tibet is more of a 
contingent pseudo-state than a clear cut either sovereign state or part of China. History is far 
more complex than the state authority’s propaganda. The ways in which the opposing 
narratives and discourses construct the history inevitably tie up to their attitude laden with 
‘identity’ bias.  
 
Much ink has been spent on the topic of Tibetan identity and its sub-state nationalist 
movement, yet little has been committed to a comprehensive and systematic discussion of 
Tibetan national identity as such.  The use of the concept ‘identity’ has been criticized as too 
analytically loose to be as useful a tool. As a result, Abdelal et al. propose to solve this 
‘identity crisis’ by developing the analytical rigor and methodological imagination that seeks 
to make ‘identity’ a more measurable variable (Abdelal et al. 2006: 695). Their analytic 
framework approaches the troubling term ‘identity’ by two dimensions – content and 
contestation. The content of social identities takes the form of four non-mutually-exclusive 
types: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models. The 
Contestation dimension of social identities refers to the degree of agreement within a group 
over the content of shared identity. By the use of this framework, Abdelal et al. believe that 
the four types of content encompass the variety of meanings in social identities, while 
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contestation over content addresses the fluidity and contextual nature of identities. The 
framework thus provides a useful platform to examine how social identities are constructed 
by discourses characterized by rival powers and contested representations. The following 
section will discuss each form of the contents and its contestations. 
 
Constitutive norms 
The first form of content, constitutive norms, refers to the formal and informal rules that 
define group membership. They are the normative content of a collective identity that 
specifies its constitutive rules, the practices that define that identity and lead other actors to 
recognize it (Abdelal et al. 2006: 697). What defines Tibet as a nation? What is the group 
membership for Tibetans and what is it constituted of? On the official website of the Tibet 
Government-in-exile, there are five elements listed under ‘About Tibet’: His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, the geographic facts of Tibet, national flag, national anthem, and their global 
governing organizations. Interestingly these national elements are not much different from the 
PRC’s early ethnic classification criteria informed by Stalin to determine minzu: a common 
language, a common territory, a common economy, and a common psychological nature 
manifested in a common culture (Kolas & Thowsen 2005: 38).  In what follows, this section 
examines how the Tibetan identities are constructed and contested in four constitutive norms: 
religion, language, territory and populations, and historical symbols. 
 
First of all, religion has supreme importance that it is the core of the constitutive contents of 
Tibetan identity. For indigenous people in Tibet, His Holiness the fourteenth Dalai Lama, 
Tenzin Gyatso, is the supreme symbol of their communities, their identification, and their 
aspiration for statehood. As the reincarnating spiritual and political leader of Tibet, the roots 
of his lineage trace further back in time, to ‘the mythological beginning, for the bodhisattva of 
compassion, of whom the dalai Lama is the human incarnation,…is also the progenitor of the 
Tibetan people’ (Lopez 1998: 184, quoted in Houston & Wright 2003: 217). Tibetan historian 
Shakya also said, ‘Buddhism had always been seen as the core of Tibetan identity, and its 
clergy the epitome of Tibetanness’ (Shakya 1999: 419). Indeed, the Dalai Lama is the epitome 
of Tibetan belief and religion, which in turn holds the key for both Tibetans and outsiders to 
Moving Beyond Identity: The Tibet Question Revisited 
40 
understand how the people in Tibet organize their life, the nature of authority, and the 
religious, political, and legal ideologies that constitute Tibetan identities.   
 
According to Tibetan religious history, the arrival of Buddhism was a staggered achievement 
since the seventh century. A highly influential fourteenth century ritual text, the Mani Kabum, 
describes this process in terms of the compassionate intervention of the Buddha-
cumbodhisattva Chenresig, a celestial deity and manifestation of the Buddha Amitabha (Mills 
2003: 12). In various forms, Chenresig is then said to have chaperoned the nascent Tibetan 
race. In contemporary Tibet, the Dalai Lama is now considered by the Gelugpa, the Yellow 
Hat sect, and many other Tibetan Buddhists to be the primary earthly manifestation of 
Chenresig. 
 
These indigenous narratives, however, are themselves problematic. The narratives of Tibetan 
religious histories are very much state mandate histories, the stories of the Kings. From an 
anthropological point of view, those founding myths of the nation are more pious 
reconstructions rather than independent history. Anthropology shows that the Tibetan regions 
of the early time, before the empire period, were barren and politically fragmented 
wastelands, populated by normadic herders, brigands and local warlords, whose religious life 
was dominated by local mountain worship and other earth cults. This heterogeneous 
indigenous ritual life is now often subsumed under the wider rubric of Bon back then, or 
Tibetan Buddhism today (Mills 2003: 8).  
 
The domination of Tibetan Buddhism nowadays is the result of long struggle and power 
politics in history. Today Bon still forms a structured doctrine. At different times in history, its 
relationship with Buddhism was rather unfriendly. Adherents of Bon were periodically 
persecuted and often had to convert to Buddhism. After a long struggle with the TGIE, the 
Bonpo finally managed to speak to the Dalai Lama in person. In 1978 the Dalai Lama 
acknowledged the Bon religion as a school with its own practices, which meant an important 
step towards an integration of the Bon community in the Tibetan exile community. 
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Under the narratives of the Tibetan authority, history is simplified and Tibetans are naturalized 
with only one common national religion. For historians and anthropologists, the indigenous 
historical narratives are clearly different from ‘objective’ histories. It is equally unjustifiable if 
the CCP ignore the Tibetan people’s lived experience of religious belief, and try to 
‘modernize’ them overnight.  For Marxist CCP, the religious domination of Tibetan society 
renders Buddhist ideology hegemonic, suppressing the natural political consciousness of the 
peasant class. The strategy of coercively secularizing the religious Tibetans by the CCP, 
however, is in itself another form of hegemonic domination of the minority groups with 
different beliefs. After all, the indigenous narrative of Tibet’s transformation by Buddhism 
feeds into the subtle discourses about Tibetan’s religious identity, which constitutes a central 
plank in a series of understandings, about Buddhism’s institutional presence, and the 
ubiquitous and ever-present influence of chthonic forces on the character of Tibetans as 
people, whose position in the cultural and religious imaginations of Tibetans is significant 
(Mills 2003: 8). All of these ways of life can not be changed overnight for the Tibetans. The 
PRC has to replace the coercive strategy towards the Tibetan’s religion with a more 
accommodating one. 
 
Secondly, language has always been the focal point of national identity. Tibet is imagined as a 
nation by the Tibetans because Tibetan is a language ‘spoken primarily on the high plateau 
north of the Himalaya’ (Norbu 2001: 383). Norbu argues that the regional variations of 
Tibetan are only dialects and accents.  As one of the main criteria of ethnic minority defined 
by Stalin, languages have received a great deal of attention during the ethnic classification 
project for Chinese scholars. Minority languages are classified in subgroups, branches, 
groups, and language families. Scholars disagree on a method of classifying, for example, 
Tibeto-Burman languages and especially on distinguishing languages from dialects. For 
instance, many Tibetans in Sichuan speak languages other than Tibetan. Of a total of 308,467 
Tibetans in Ngaba Prefecture in 1982, there were diverse languages or dialects being used by 
the locals (Table 3.1). 
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Among them, Ergong and Baima are only 
recently confirmed languages. According to a 
Chinese government white paper, ten ethnic 
groups in China use thirteen written languages 
that have been ‘created or improved with the 
help of the government’, including the Miao, 
Naxi, Lisu, Hani, Va, Dong, Jingpo, and Tu 
languages (Kolas & Thowsen 2005: 38-41). 
As anthropologists suggest, defining a 
particular spoken language as a dialect or a 
separate language is an extremely difficult task with obvious political consequences and is 
therefore very often controversial. For example, the claim that Baima is a separate language is 
tied to a dispute over whether the Baima constitute their own ethnic group or are, as now 
classified, Tibetan. These diverse languages clearly cannot be subsumed by a common 
language of Tibetan and explained by regional variation of dialects and accents. 
 
Thirdly, territory has long been an important foundation for an ‘imagined community’. 
According to the TGIE, under Chinese rule Tibet is divided into the following administrative 
units (Figure 3.2):  
a) Tibet Autonomous Region,  
b) Qinghai Province,  
c) Tianzu Tibetan Autonomous County and Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in 
Gansu Province,  
d) Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
and Mili Tibetan Autonomous County in Sichuan Province,  
e) Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province.  
Language/Dialect speaking: Population: 
Tibetan Amdo dialect 153,000  
Jiarong language 91,000 
Qiang language 41,000 
Ergong language 11,000 
Baima language 4,000 
Chinese 8,000 
Table 3.1: Language diversity in Ngaba Prefecture 
(Courtesy of Kolas & Thowsen 2005) 
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The total Tibetan population in Tibet is 6 million. Of them, 2.09 million live in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region TAR and the rest in the Tibetan areas outside the TAR.26 According to 
this TGIE’s narrative, one quarter of the PRC’s territory belongs to Tibetans. Norbu asserts 
that the Tibetan Plateau is a unique geographical entity in and by itself which crystallized 
Tibetan national identity (Norbu 2001: 384).  
 
Figure 3.2: The map of Ethnographic Tibet (Courtesy of Fisher 2011) 
 
Remarkably, Tibetans were so divided prior to 1950 that they did not have a single term that 
referred to all Tibetan people, especially not one that was acceptable to eastern Tibetans. 
While today some Tibetans in eastern Tibet might willingly call themselves ‘Bomi’ or ‘Bopa’, 
such terms historically meant people from central Tibet, a region at the centre of the current 
TAR, including Lhasa, Shigatse, and parts of Lhoka and Kongpo  
(Bertrand & Laliberte 2010: 221). In fact, historians pose that at the beginning of the Tibetan 
popular nationalist movement in 1957, no term could be agreed upon by all of those whom we 
today call ‘Tibetans’, so they called themselves simply ‘tsampa eaters’ as this conveyed a 
distinct sense of their shared commonality, as opposed to the Chinese ‘rice eaters’, without 
privileging any one regional designation.  
                                               
26
 See the information from the official website of the TGIE: http://tibet.net/about-tibet/tibet-at-a-glance/ (access on 
09/02/2012). 
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Fourthly, the modern Tibetan identity is heavily dependent on historical symbols to hold the 
diverse populations together. According to TGIE’s narrative, during the reign of the seventh-
century king, Songtsen Gampo, Tibet was one of the mightiest empires in Central Asia. Tibet, 
then, had an army of 2,860,000 men. Each regiment of the army had its own banner. The 
banner of ‘Ya-ru To’ regiment had a pair of snow lions facing each other, that of ‘Ya-ru Ma’ a 
snow lion standing upright, springing upwards towards the sky, while the banner of ‘U-ru To’ 
regiment had a white flame against a red background. This tradition continued until the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama designed a new banner and issued a proclamation for its adoption by 
all the military establishments. This banner became the present Tibetan national flag27. This 
narrative itself recognizes the multi-regiment structure of the ancient Tibetan society, not to 
mention the modern construction of the historical symbols.  
 
Tibetan in Exile not only reinterprets the meaning of some selective traditions, but it also 
establishes entirely new ones as well. For example, in order to commemorate the 87,000 
‘Tibetans’ killed during the Lhasa uprising in 1959, a ceremony is held by the TGIE featuring 
the statement by the Dalai Lama, a performance of Tibetan folk dances and a rendition of the 
Tibetan national anthem written in exile (Kolas 2008: 57). All these activities function to 
foster the perception of a universal identity of Tibet. 
 
Religion, population, territory, national flag, and national anthem, are all constitutive norms 
that contribute to the hegemonic formation of the ‘imagined community’ in Tibet. However, 
as the discussion above shows, none of those constitutive norms are inherently static or 
essential. Rather, each of them is a historical construction and a political invention, by 




                                               
27
 The description of how the national symbols were born in the TGIE website: http://tibet.net/about-tibet/the-tibetan-
national-flag/ (access on 09/02/2012). 
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Social purposes 
Social purposes refer to the goals that are shared by members of a group, and define group 
interests and preferences. This purposive content is analytically similar to the common sense 
notion that what groups want depends on who they think they are (Abdelal et al. 2006: 698). 
In other words, a group identity can be analyzed by the members’ collective needs, goals, and 
aspirations in the future. The literature on Tibet has provided plenty of case studies on how 
nationalist movements rely on a variety of purposive claims, such as nation and state building, 
territorial claims, religious freedom, cultural preservation, and economic development. 
 
For the Tibetan authority, national survival is the primary goal of the Tibetan nationalist 
movement, and arguably the primary purposive content of Tibetan identity. Although the 
motivation behind the recent uprising in 2008 varies, the debate of the motivation has helped 
understand the purposive character of a Tibetan identity. Many scholars maintain that the 
recent uprising in 2008 was a Tibetan response to the identity insecurity caused by Chinese 
ethnic policy, migration, and cultural imperialism. Shakya, for example, wrote in the New 
Left Review, ‘I do not think the demonstrations were principally to do with economic 
disparities or disadvantages suffered by Tibetans. Rather, I think there were defensive 
protests, concerning questions of national identity’ (Shakya 2008: 19). How does this national 
identity demand come into political prominence? 
 
The Dalai Lama’s envisioning of a Tibetan statehood has been evolving. In the nineteen 
eighties, the Dalai Lama refused to even imply that Tibet is part of China. In 1987, the Dalai 
Lama said, ‘Tibetans and Chinese are distinct peoples each other with their own country, 
history, culture, language and way of life’. Later however Dalai Lama made a clearer 
blueprint for Tibet’s state building that upholds the principals of religious freedom and 
democracy, without explicit independence claim. In his 1988 Strasbourg Proposal before the 
European Parliament, he laid out his initial positions on autonomy that the PRC would remain 
responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy, while Tibet would be governed by its own constitution 
or basic law28. The Tibetan government would be comprised of a popularly elected chief 
executive, a bicameral legislature and an independent legal system. And it would have a 
                                               
28
 See the official website of the Dalai Lama: http://www.dalailama.com/messages/middle-way-approach 
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special duty to safeguard and develop religious practice (He & Sautman 2005: 608). This 
proposal gradually formed the famous ‘Middle Way Approach’ by the Dalai Lama, which was 
formalized by the TGIE. This TGIE claims that this approach is adopted in democratic way, 
but its legitimacy is clearly in question as it is only approved within the TGIE, excluding the 
majority of the Tibetans in the PRC. 
 
The Tibet In Exile plays a central role for the construction of a pan-Tibetan identity. The Dalai 
Lama is seen not only the spiritual and religious leader in the greater Tibetan communities, 
but also the founder and head of the parliamentary Tibetan government-in-exile, the 
Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies. For Tibetans, the Dalai Lama will eventually 
become the head of a democratic state with the separation of the power: legislative, judiciary, 
and executive (Houston and Wright 2003: 221). The fight for a Tibetan statehood by TGIE 
dominates the projected future for ordinary Tibetans. This purposive prospect for the ordinary 
Tibetans, in turn, has been politically naturalized by the Tibetan nationalist discourse. 
 
Secondly, religious belief is constructed not only as the core of their distinctive culture, but 
also the purposes of life for Tibetans. One Chinese historian pointed out, Tibetan Buddhism 
and Tibetan culture is largely one and the same; their relationship is like the one between 
blood and flesh, which is inseparable (Zheng 2010: 55). Tibetan Buddhism is the root of 
Tibetan ethnicity and it provides the cultural fabric to form and congregate Tibetan people. 
Religion has been part of many Tibetans’ life for generations. Besides the fact that most 
Tibetans were spiritually devout Buddhists, there are some political, social, and economic 
purposes that explain why religion has been so deeply embedded in their life, particularly 
before the democratic reform by the CCP. Firstly, under the combined religious and secular 
system of government, becoming a monk or nun was a very important way to lift oneself up 
on the social ladder in the highly stratified society of Tibet. Secondly, monasteries are the 
major supplier of literacy and knowledge because of the shortage of systematic education. 
Thirdly, for those poor families, sending their children to monasteries could mean fewer 
mouths to be fed at home, and better life for their children in a religious setting (Zheng 2010: 
61).  
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Moreover, the fight for religious freedom of the Tibetans living in the PRC has become 
another mobilizing force for the Tibetan nationalist movement. The PRC officials claim that 
there are no restrictions on religious belief, whereas the TGIE maintain there is no religious 
freedom in Tibet (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 7). There are obvious state regulations on 
religious practice in Tibet by the PRC. Anyone wanting to become a monk has to seek 
permission from the county-level authorities, and there is number limit. As for the number of 
monks and nuns, it is quite contested. The official figure is 120,000; Shakya’s estimation is 
about 180,000 (Shakya 2008: 16). Shakya also argues that economic development by the PRC 
actually helped to generate the revival of the monasteries. This complicated situation of 
religious freedom in Tibet defies the one-sided story told by either PRC or the TGIE. 
 
Thirdly, the Tibetans’ nationalist movement, from the outset, proclaims to counter the PRC’s 
policy of the dilution of the Tibetan culture from the Han. As Norbu persistently asserts, 
‘Tibet represented a unique case of a full-blown Mahayana Tantric Buddist cultural category 
that was hard to find in other parts of Asia’. (Norbu 2001: 382). Many Tibetans expressed 
their fears of the CCP’s potential conspiracy hidden beneath, such as the critical trend of 
sinocization in all aspects of day-to-day life in Tibet. From the mid 1990s, under the new 
strategy of ‘develop the west’ (xibu da kaifa) China has significantly increased its economic 
input, and consequently more and more Han Chinese migrate into the TAR, particularly the 
urban areas. One of the greatest fears that Tibetans have is that they will become a minority in 
their own land, and that Tibetan culture is being diluted not only by Han migration to the 
region, but also by interracial marriage with the local population. 
 
Both sides have their story for this population ‘myth’. The PRC census count of the Han 
population in TAR was obviously underestimated, particularly ignoring the floating and 
military migration. Some argue that the Han immigrants have dramatically changed the 
demographic composition and atmosphere of cities like Lhasa, and the process is beginning to 
expand to smaller towns. Andrew Fisher’s study shows, however, that the Han population 
inflow varied over different periods, different regions, and the changes of the PRC’s economic 
policy (Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 145). Above all, the exile allegation of 7.5 million Han, 
contrasting 6 million Tibetan, refers to all the Tibetan areas in China, including provinces 
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such as Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan. Second, Han in the Tibetan areas are mostly 
concentrated in cities and towns and very visible, while Tibetan rural areas have remained 
mostly Tibetans. Moreover, the outflows of population, both Han and Tibetans, have 
consistently exceeded inflows in areas such as Qinghai, and mostly in the TAR, since the 
beginning of the reform period, largely because of the hardship in the highlands. A fair share 
of Tibetan refugee migration to India can thus be understood as young Tibetans leaving in 
search of better opportunities rather than simply because of the Han influx. Lastly, the sharp 
increases of the net inflows of migration observed in the TAR since 2000 have been 
stimulated by the massive increases in subsidies under the Western Development Strategy. 
Fisher argues that amongst these migration inflows most of them were disproportionately 
male and seasonal migrants (Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 148-149). Therefore, while the 
PRC’ needs to address the Tibetans’ hostile responses to the development strategy; the TGIE’s 
‘population colonization’ allegation is equally exaggerating. Partly fueled by the nationalist 
movement, the protests in Lhasa were not only against the CCP government, but also against 
ordinary Chinese people who have settled in Tibet (Shakya 2008: 19). This shows the aspect 
of exclusion in the Tibetan nationalist movement, as it is found in most countries’ nationalist 
movement. If this pursuit for national identity goes extreme, it becomes essentially a form of 
racism against Han and other ethnicities. 
  
Fourthly, a demand for basic human rights has been one of the main uniting purposes for 
Tibetans since the first uprising in 1959. The PRC usually present a very bleak picture of the 
former ‘feudal’ Tibetan society in order to show the improvement in the Tibetans’ standard of 
living and social status after the communist reform. The TGIE, however, declared that ‘the 
basic human rights are being denied to Tibetans…Tibet is in virtual lockdown. Foreigners 
have been barred from travelling to Tibet now and the entire region is essentially under 
undeclared martial law.29’ While the PRC’s picture of the old Tibetan ‘feudal serfdom’ is 
overly simplified, Tibet was more or less a very hierarchical society with strata in which there 
was a separation between clergy and lay people. The latter were divided into three strata: the 
aristocracy, the common people, and the lower class, including farmers. There were also 
subgroups amongst farmers. Only the ‘small householders’ of farmers were strictly serfs 
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(Blondeau & Buffetrille 2008: 295). It’s undisputable that the takeover of the PRC has 
brought a certain amount of modernization to Tibet. The research by Goldstein, Jiao, Beall, 
and Tsering endorses that the PRC’s rule, particularly the post-Mao de-collectivization in 
Tibet has clearly brought improvement to the livelihood and standard of living of rural 
Tibetans (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 211). 
 
However, it is inaccurate to consider this modernization by the PRC without its manifold 
negative effects, such as environment devastation and human rights issues. Goldstein et al. 
argue that modernization has also created a new form of economic stratification and a stratum 
of very poor rural household (Sautman & Dreyer 2006: 211).  In a similar vein, Hu and 
Salazar’s research shows that the urbanization and industrialization through the swift 
penetration of the market toward the rural areas is happening in Tibet today just as they 
started in coastal east China since the late 1970s (Hu & Salazar 2008). The Hukou system has 
been the dominant, state-enforced institution of classifier of social distinction in Tibet as well 
as the rest of China. As a result, the institutionalized discrimination of urban against rural is 
stronger (even more continuously present) than the non-institutionalized prejudices between 
ethnic groups, i.e. Tibetan and Han. Hu and Salazar’s study aptly demonstrates that the 
marginalized people very often use the political strength of ethnic identity as the ‘master 
identity’ to pursue their political needs against the state. Table 3.2 and 3.3 (Zheng 2010: 40) 
show the large urban-rural income gap in the TAR compared to the average of the PRC. As 




Table 3.2 Rural and urban average income in TAR 2007 (compared with the national, in RMB) 
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Table 3.3: Urban-rural income gap in TAR and China 2003-2007 (times) 
 
At the heart of the construct of the Tibetan identity is an escape from the East Han 
Chauvinism and Communism, and a return to indigenous central Asia, being closer 
geopolitically and ideologically to the liberal West. The above analysis shows that there are 
underlying aspirations, needs, or goals in the construction of the Tibetan identity sanctioned 
by the TGIE, which is at once intertwined with other non-identity dimensions, such as 
economic, religious, and political pursuits. More importantly, ethnic or national identity is 
often the most effective group classification for political elites to mobilize the mass for their 
own political agenda.  It is thus more illuminating to examine the purposive disagreement 




Relational comparisons define an identity group by what it is not, i.e., the way it views other 
identity groups, especially where those views about the other are a defining part of the 
identity (Abdelal et al. 2006: 698). Barnett argues that identity represents the understanding of 
oneself in relationship to others. Group identities, for him, are not personal or psychological, 
but are fundamentally social and relational, defined by the actor’s interaction with and 
relationship to others. Therefore, identities may be contingent, dependent on the actor’s 
interaction with others and place within an institutional context (Barnett 1999: 9).  From this 
standpoint, the Tibetan identity is embedded in the ‘us’ and ‘other’ relations. The fact that the 
relations between Tibet and China are never static, and ever evolving, in turn, complicates the 
way the Tibetan identity is being defined. There are periods of ups and downs in the history of 
China-Tibet relations.  
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The CCP’s attitude towards ethnic groups has changed over the time. Early Chinese 
communists, especially those educated in Moscow, were influenced by Lenin’s minority 
policy. Mao experimented with a Leninist federal structure with minority republics. The 
Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the CCP in July 1922 clearly included 
statements about national minority, ‘the achievement of a genuine republic by the liberation of 
Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang; the establishment of a Chinese federated republic by the 
unification of China proper.’ (Norbu 2001: 368-369). As the communist forces retreated into 
the southwest, Mao saw a certain level of anti-Chinese sentiment amongst minorities. When 
Stalin succeeded Lenin, he reduced the rights of the nationalities on the Asian Soviet 
republics. Mao adopted Stalin’s model, partly with a colonial strategic consideration, i.e. 
creating buffer zones in Tibet against neighboring threats: Britain, the Soviet, India, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and the Asian republics of the Soviet Union. As a result, Tibet under the first 
PRC Constitution was not republic but ‘autonomous region’ (Wolff 2010: 131-132). Tibet, as 
a tiny power with weak army, was basically left with no choice but to sign the Seventeen 
Point of Agreement in 1951. However, under the rule of the PRC, the ethnic consciousness of 
the Tibetans did not wither away. In fact, it increased.  
 
The act of ‘peacefully’ uniting Tibet into China has unintentionally sewed the seed of the 
Tibetan identity. The introduction of Chinese armed forces followed by Communist reform, as 
well as the influx of Chinese administrative cadres and inhabitants into Tibet since 1951, have 
given the diverse and historically divided peoples now called Tibetans a visible ‘other’ against 
whom to define themselves (Bertrand & Laliberte 2010: 221). During the first period of rule, 
the CCP sought to work in alliance with Tibet’s traditional ruling class. In the beginning, Mao 
was in no hurry to force socialism upon Tibet but rather court the Elites and ordered a ‘Go 
Slow’ policy. Mao intended to rule Tibet by proxy, through Tibet’s traditional government but 
superimposing over it a Chinese Communist structure (Wolff 2010: 146). A honeymoon 
period followed under this policy. At that time, the 16 year old Fourteenth Dalai Lama 
thought Buddhism and Marxism could co-exist. He believed that communism could improve 
the lot of the Tibetan people in material terms by bringing modernization to Tibet. The Dalai 
Lama spent six months in Beijing, meeting Mao, and taking part in the National People’s 
Congress.  
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If the trajectory of the history followed this trend, there would have been no ‘Tibet Question’ 
today. However, the PRC largely failed to live up to its Marxist ethnic policy. With the 
passage of time, the PRC’s policy and practice towards Tibet shifted to political centralism 
and Han chauvinism. Its nationality policy held that Communist China would be an 
indivisible multi-ethnic state with autonomous nationality regions that have very limited 
freedom on their own affairs. After the 1959 uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama, the 
second period 1960-78 saw the extension of Communist reforms and the redistribution of 
monastic and aristocratic lands, accelerating with the collectivization and mass mobilization 
of the Cultural Revolution. The relations between the Tibetan monasteries and the CCP 
deteriorated. Following 1980, there was an era of much greater liberalization and 
‘Tibetanization’ under Hu Yaobang until the second uprising in 1989. The recent Chinese 
policy towards Tibet under President Hu Jintao continues the tone of a hardline policy, 
combined with the economic development strategy and the slogan of anti-splittism and anti-
terrorism.  
 
The interrelation and interaction between Tibet and China is an important dimension of the 
discursive construction of the Tibetan identity. Dawa Norbu rightly observes how the Tibetan 
ethnicity has been politicized from merely regional identities to more encompassing Tibetan 
identity by the takeover of the PRC. Before the politicization of Tibetan ethnicity, ‘we’ and 
‘they’, or Tibetan and non-Tibetan, was a Buddhist differentiation (vaguely) between 
believers and non-believers. However, since the Chinese takeover in 1959, there has been a 
growing consciousness, particularly among urban Tibetans, about a pan-Tibetan identity that 
sharply differentiates itself from the Chinese/Han (Kolas & Thowsen 2005: 42). 
 
The notion of modern Tibet is also largely an institutional invention, particularly, by the 
PRC’s Ethnic Classification Project beginning in 1954. Mullaney’s study examines China’s 
Ethnic Classification Project (minzu shibie), a collective term for a series of Communist-era 
expeditions wherein ethnologists and linguists set out to determine once and for all the precise 
ethnonational composition of the country, so that these different groups might be integrated 
into a centralized, territorially stable polity (Mullaney 2010). Mullaney’s study convincingly 
Chapter 3. National identity in China and Tibet 
53 
shows how four-hundred would-be minzu got squashed into the fifty-five official minorities 
accepted today. In a similar vein, Tuttle argues that the Chinese state classification of Tibetans 
(zangzu) as a single ethnic group (minzu) has given this formerly fragmented group a more 
cohesive sense of identity (Bertrand & Laliberte 2010: 221).  
 
The PRC’s policy toward minorities was implemented through the Nationalities Affairs 
Commission (NAC). The NAC is meant to pursue a policy of uniting with patriotic 
bourgeoisie nationalities upper strata in carrying out reforms and economic development in 
the region (Mukherjee 2010: 471).  However, Han chauvinism clearly trumps this policy 
during the implementation. As early as October 1951, Zhou Enlai stated difficulties would 
soon arise if Han cadres were not educated against chauvinist attitudes, and attacked the 
‘narrow nationalism’ of individual Han who continued to harbor feelings of superiority 
toward Tibetans. Unfortunately, the Chinese cadres did not listen, and nationality uniting 
policy gradually gave way to Han chauvinism and a narrow version of Marxism with Chinese 
characteristics. Chinese propaganda was directed at liberating Tibetans from feudalism and 
imperialism, and transforming Tibetan local nationalism into proletarian internationalism. A 
poster campaign of 1951 was intended to depict the might of China, the solidarity of China 
and the USSR, and the need for Tibetans and Chinese to unite against Anglo-American 
imperialism (Mukherjee 2010: 472). 
 
As another form of Chinese bureaucracy that oversees the Tibet issues, the Religious Affairs 
Bureau (RAB) is an affiliated organization under the State Council, which was established in 
1954 and remains responsible for the supervision of religious activities (Mukherjee 2010: 
472). Officially accepted religions, such as Buddhism and Daoism, have some representation 
in the government. However, temples and monasteries registered with the RAB were only 
given a limited degree of freedom. Moreover, the United Front, whose primary target was the 
Tibetan government, and the co-opt of all political and socio-religious groups, has been 
working with ideological programs in conflict with the religious ideology of Tibetan 
Buddhists. 
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These ups and downs of China-Tibet relations, and the state institutional differentiation and 
reinforcement of the ethnic groups show how Tibetan national identity comes to rise by the 
resistance to the ‘other’. Tibet and Tibetan as identity, by and large, has been politically and 
institutionally invented by the rule of the PRC. The relational comparisons above reveal 
another important dimension in Tibetan identity construction, in which group identity is never 
pre-existing or static, but fundamentally relational and contextual. It is perhaps much more 
revealing to look at the relaitonality of Tibet and China, rather than dwelling on the wishy-
washy concept of ‘identity’. 
 
Cognitive models 
Cognitive models refer to the worldviews or understandings of political and material 
conditions and interests that are shaped by a particular identity (Abdelal et al. 2006: 699).  
 
‘What cognitive perspectives suggest, in short, is that race, ethnicity, and nation are not 
things in the world but ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and 
identifying oneself, making sense of one’s problems and predicaments, identifying one’s 
interests, and orienting one’s action. They are ways of recognizing, identifying, and 
classifying other people, of construing sameness and difference, and of ‘coding’ and 
making sense of their actions.’ (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, quoted in Abdelal et 
al. 2006: 699).  
 
In other words, it is that ‘interpretation’ matter leads to the identity matter. In the case of 
contemporary Tibet, there are two issues that epitomize the opposing world views between 
China and Tibet. 
 
One of the most heated disputes between the PRC and the Tibetan authority is that the 
Chinese authorities equate any expression of Tibetan identity, be it religious or cultural, with 
separatism. The PRC seems to think that if it allows any kind of cultural autonomy, it will 
escalate into demands for secession. In Tibet, everything from newspapers and magazines to 
music distribution is kept firmly under control, whereas all over China there are increasing 
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numbers of independent publishing houses. Shakya speaks of a joke in Tibet that the Dalai 
Lama wants ‘one country, two systems’, but what people there want is ‘one country, one 
system’ – they want the more liberal policies (relatively) that prevail in China also to apply in 
Tibet (Shakya 2008: 26). There is certainly space for China to tolerate and accommodate the 
Tibetans’ expression of cultural identity as long as it does not escalate to separation. The 
hardline policy by the PRC has proven unsustainable and counter-effective.   
 
By contrast, the Tibet’s pursuit of political rights by the claim of a distinctive and exclusive 
national identity is equally unconvincing, and it worsens the already deep distrust between 
two parties. For Tibetans, a unique and distinctive Tibetan identity is a powerful and universal 
claim to counter the legitimacy of the PRC’s rule. While the strategy of mobilization of a 
unified Tibetan identity functions to challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese development in 
Tibet, it has its own limitations. It not only essentially discriminates any other non-Tibetans, 
Han and other ethnic groups, but also leads Tibetans to live in the imagination free from 
contamination of industrial development, population migration, and cultural exchange. Lopez 
has put it bluntly: Tibetans are ‘prisoners of Shangri-la’, captured within the Western images 
of Tibet and Tibetans as unique (Anand 2007: 84). This prevailing world view of a unique 
Tibet is a hegemonic construct, and continues to deepen the racial exclusion against the Han, 
and the political antagonism between the two sides. 
 
The second primary cleavage between China and Tibet is the nature of the PRC’s ‘develop the 
west’ (xibu da kaifa) strategy. The Tibetan authorities equate any effort of economic 
development with ‘cultural genocide’. Dawa Norbu basically perceives the whole ‘develop 
the west’ project by the PRC as a Communist conspiracy to assimilate the Tibetan civilization 
(Sautman 2006: 158). He quoted some of the Chinese officials, that one purpose of the 
(develop the west) scheme is to ‘guarantee the inviolability’ of the PRC’s borders in the 
western region, and to ‘smash our enemies who want to use poverty and the contradictions 
between races to create a Kosovo-style crisis in Asia’ (Sautman 2006: 159). This is an 
interesting example to show how ‘interpretation’ is at work between rival parties. Certainly 
the purpose of the CCP is not purely for the prosperity and wealth of the Tibetans. It is, 
however, inevitable for China, in fact for any state, to include strategic consideration and 
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national interest in large infrastructure building 30 . Norbu’s interpretation of the Chinese 
officials and their policies tends to explain the cognitive processes of how most Tibetans’ 
hostile views towards the PRC are shaped and reshaped by the PRC’s statements. In the case 
of the construction of the Qinghai-Lhasa railway, many pro-Tibetan commentators argue that 
the railway will definitely increase the influx of the Chinese immigrants and the scope of 
urbanization, and lead to devastating economic effects on the indigenous population. There is 
certainly some validity in this criticism of the PRC’s wrong treatment of the indigenous 
tradition. However, the one-sided negation of the PRC’s development policies appears equally 
problematic.   
 
Moreover, the criticism of China’s economic development policy in Tibet often simplified 
China’s development model as an idiosyncratic one, i.e. state capitalism. However, it is easy 
to overlook the multiple roles that China plays in the world economic hierarchy: the West-
China-Tibet. For the West, China is by and large a developing country providing cheap labor 
and products to the West. Between Tibet and China, China is not only the powerful colonizer 
who is exporting economic growth drive and exerting cultural influence, but also a 
beneficiary of the abundant and cheap natural and human resources. Between Tibet and 
China, China plays exactly the same role as the West does vis-à-vis China. As China is 
integrating into the capitalist globalization, Beijing and the West are in broad agreement on 
matters such as developing market economies, privatization, and free trade. On the one hand, 
China gains legitimacy of rule in Tibet because of those economic consensus. On the other 
hand, the West has had to put Tibet issues behind the priority of economic interdependence 
with China.  In this sense, the West is essentially pro-China. The debate between the Chinese 
model and the West model is therefore a faulty dichotomy. Tibet, China, and the West are all 
intertwined in capitalist globalization.  
 
The cognitive models analysis above has shown the conflictual identities between China and 
Tibet closely tie to their contentious and disputed world views on practical issues. The change 
of cognitive worldview is a critical step, also arguably the first step, to change the 
antagonistic political status quo. The reason why it is so difficult finding an overlapping view 
                                               
30
 In regard to the relations between national interest and discourse by state, see Weldes, J. 1999. Constructing National 
Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
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between two parties is that each party claims its legitimacy to the ‘nation’ by the opposing 
construction of history and identity. There is no possible common ground for both parties 
because of the inherently exclusive nature of a collective identity. A transformative common 
ground that breaks away the identity claims, therefore, is needed to create the shared cognitive 
world view of both parties.  
 
3.3 ‘Whatever’ identity 
 
The previous section has shownu how Tibetan identity has been constructed and contested by 
dominant discourses through the content and contestation framework, which has helped to 
reveal the processes of how a collective identity came to seem natural. Identity is mostly 
treated as things to be explained. In social science, scholars take identities both as things to be 
explained, and things that have explanatory force, which amounts almost to a scandal 
(Fearron 1999: 2).  It is, however, vastly overlooked whether identity is viable as a concept 
that has explanatory force. The contested ways of Tibetan identity construction show the 
problem of the uncritical constructivist approaches. For some constructivist, Tibetans are seen 
to do things because they are religiously Buddhists, or ethnically Tibetans, which effectively 
essentializes Tibetans as a group. 
 
By contrast, critical theorists assert the possibility of alternative modes of consciousness and 
identity that are effectively silenced by the dominant ideology. Callahan argues that the 
analysis of the construction of identity through discourse only covers half of the relations that 
produce identity. The other half lies behind the face of how identity seems like this: the 
exclusion of the difference (Callahan 2004: xxiii).  In what follows, this section explores other 
marginalized stories that are vastly silenced by the dominant discourses. From a critical 
approach to the phenomenon of ‘identity’ matter, we not only need to explain how identity 
comes to seem like this, but also need to criticize it and anticipate a different form of politics 
that moves beyond identity. 
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The West and Orientalism 
The Tibetan identity debate primarily focuses on China-Tibet relations, with another major 
actor, the West, being more or less ignored. Postconlonialists maintain that particular 
encounters between the West and the non-West have shaped the latter, and in the case of 
Tibet, the West’s representational discourses are not reflective of, but actually productive of 
the Tibetan identity (Anand 2007: 14). The West representation of the Orient is constructed by 
essentializing and stereotyping the other. Essentialism is the notion that some core meaning or 
identity is determinate and not subject to interpretation. Inden argues that essentialist’s world 
view tend to ignore the ‘intricacies of agency’ pertinent to the flux and development of any 
social system. (Anand 2007: 19). In the colonial context, we find essentialism in the reduction 
of the indigenous people to an ‘essential’ idea of what it means to be ‘native’, for instance, 
African as singing-dancing-fighting, Chinese as rigid and duplicitous, Tibetans as religious. 
 
A stereotype is a one-sided description of a group or culture resulting from the collapsing of 
complex differences into single ‘card-board cut-out’, seeing people as a preset image and 
‘more of a formula than a human being’ (Anand 2007: 19). Stereotyping served imperialism at 
both representational and psychic levels – supporting the idea of parental domination and 
acting as a kind of perceptual blinder protecting the colonizers from the discomforting 
consciousness of either poverty or guilt (Lebow 1976: 22, quoted in Anand 2007: 20). 
Stereotyping is a simplification because it freezes what is otherwise a fluid, contested, 
complex, always in-becoming identity. 
 
The Western fantasization of Tibet takes a great share of the historical and social construction 
of the Tibetan-ness. As Anand aptly puts it, Western representation, both academic and 
popular, has been a crucial factor in shaping the identity of Tibet as a geopolitical entity as 
well as shaping the identity of the Tibetans (Anand 2007: 21-36).  Take the US in Tibet for 
example. In all the historical accounts to date, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
involvement in Tibet began in 1956. The late William R. Corson, a Chinese-speaking Marine 
lieutenant colonel, veteran of the Pacific campaign in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and 
also an intelligence officer on assignment with the CIA, claimed that he was involved in 
planning the anti-Chinese revolt in Lhasa in March 1959 and orchestrating the flight of the 
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Dalai Lama into exile (Grunfeld 2003, 133). Ken Knaus, the author of Orphans of the Cold 
War, recalls, ‘we romanticized them, they were orphans to be adopted,…there was a certain 
sense of romance attached to the Dalai Lama and his cause, a Shangri-la factor,…The State 
Department posed no opposition, and the Pentagon fell all over themselves to be helpful.’ 
(Grunfeld 2003: 119).  
 
Hardt and Negri rightly point out the two dialectical mechanisms of ethnic nationalism vis-à-
vis the West: the construction of an absolute racial difference from the other, and the eclipse 
of internal differences through the representation of the whole population by a hegemonic 
group, race, or class.  In the anti-colonial struggles, the strategy of ‘national protection’ is a 
double-edged sword that at times appears necessary despite its destructiveness (Hardt & Negri 
2000: 109). The rise of Chinese nationalism in history has proved this. China’s obsession of 
national unity, nationalist and Communist alike, against the West is precisely the outcome of 
that destructive nationalist strategy towards the internal national minorities. Today Tibet’s 
struggle for independence would run exactly the same risk of the differentiation externally 
and eclipse internally. Just like the revolutionary desire of the Black Panthers and the 
Palestinians, as soon as Tibet begins to form a sovereign state in the name of a nation, its 
progressive functions and revolutionary quality all but vanquish. While the strategy of 
mobilizing a unified Tibetan identity and support from the West functions in terms of 
challenging the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, it also has seriously hindered 
the Tibetans from imagining its own future community with openness. 
 
Gender and Tibet 
Feminists maintain that the narratives of history, and the construction of truth, are fraught 
with power. Rather than looking at national security from the masculine state perspective, 
feminists tend to see the broader sense of human security with a bottom up approach (Baylis 
et al. 2009: 270). Whereas men and masculinity are privileged in ideas of nation and history, 
women are consistently dispossessed in terms of social recognition of the individual as 
historical actor. Through the lens of observing women’s political practices, feminism reveals 
women’s disturbing presences that break the order of authorized historical narratives and in so 
doing raise questions about the nature of such order (Mcgranahan 2010: 773). 
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McGranahan’s study of Tibetan women’s general absence in battlefields, and the case study of 
two women, Dorje Yudon and Chime Dolma’s actual participation in war, blatantly expose 
that the Tibetan order of things is deeply gendered as well as Buddhist and hegemonic. 
Deferral or denial of women’s participation in order to serve the general good of society is a 
phenomenon seen across cultures, political formations, and time periods (McGranahan 2010: 
779). In Tibet’s context, initially Buddha agreed to ordain women alongside men, but 
retracted this option for social reasons as Indian society at the time would simply not allow 
for such equality between men and women. McGranahan argues that the Tibetan inheritance 
of this Indian social categorization was wholesale such that the idea that women may 
undermine the monastic order persists in the present day. As a result, religious and social 
anxieties about women’s uncontrollable sexuality continue to have real effects on Tibetan 
women, their lives, and their bodies. For example, in both dominant Buddhist philosophy and 
Tibetan cultural practice, women are systematically relegated to lower status.  Gutschow 
argues that gender is not just a ‘significant…fault line in Buddhist discourse’, but also a 
hierarchical project in which male , and especially monastic, power is built upon, and at times 
built by the female body (Mcgranahan 2010: 780). On the battlefield, in particular, the Tibetan 
soldiers feared that female pollution (menstrual blood, female body in general) could weaken 
or even destroy fully the power of their protective amulet. The female clearly signals disorder, 
and thus is discriminated in Buddhist Tibet. 
 
In the same vein, Houston and Wright’s research shows how women’s voices are silenced in 
the process of Tibetan nationalist movement and nation building. Drawing on Kerr’s study, 
they maintain that in Tibet women suffer extreme human rights abuses in the form of forced 
sterilizations, abortions, and genital mutilation (Houston & Wright 2003: 224). The 
establishment of The Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA) in 1959 was to ‘raise the public 
awareness of the abuses faced by Tibetan women in Chinese-occupied Tibet’31. In reality, 
however, the goal of the organization often becomes secondary to the larger nationalist cause. 
As a result, the TWA is engaged in fighting for the nation, rather than struggling for women’s 
rights. 
                                               
31
 See the official website: http://www.tibetanwomen.org/about/ (access on 01/02/2012). 
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Through the lens of feminism, this section has shown how women are largely ignored in the 
narratives of Tibetan history, and consistently silenced and discriminated in the nationalist 
pursuit.  Whenever the TGIE declare that they constitute a distinct civilizational category, 
they tend to forget that about half of the population (the women)’s voice is either vastly absent 
or effectively misrepresented in their political movement. This poses serious legitimacy 
question to their universal claim of nationhood. 
 
Other marginalized story tellers of Tibet 
Over the Tibetan identity debate, a focus has often been fixed on the dichotomy of ‘Tibetans’ 
and ‘Chinese’. Regional identities, however, are more or less missed out. Historically, 
Tibetans have distinguished between three major regions of Tibet: U-tsang, Amdo, and Kham.  
For some Tibetans, however, these regional identities are still understood as mutually 
exclusive categories, similar to ethnic categories. For instance, a Lhasa resident would 
identify a visitor from eastern Tibet as a ‘Khampa’, not a Tibetan (Kolas 2008: 83). 
 
In contemporary Tibet, ethnic identity is becoming more and more difficult to define, and 
subject to the influences of modern economic and cultural life. Ethnic identity has become 
increasingly relevant in Diqing (a Tibetan tourist area) with the rising economic importance of 
ethnic tourism, where ‘ethnicity’ is marketed in many different ways. In the new context, 
Tibetan identity can sometimes be a valuable asset. Kolas observed that some locals who are 
not Tibetans, and do not know a single word of Tibetan, are dressed up in Tibetan costumes 
for the purpose of selling souvenirs and other ‘Tibetan’ goods to tourists. As one Tibetan 
comments, ‘being a Tibetan is very good for business’ (Kolas 2008: 89). There is a complex 
relationship between local expressions of ethnic difference and the ‘taxonomic space’ of the 
ethnic classifications by the state. In Kolas’ field research in Shangri-la, for instance, a young 
woman who first claimed that she was a Tibetan, later revealed that her father was actually a 
Han and her mother a Naxi, and that she preferred to be a Naxi because ‘nobody likes Han 
people, not even the Han themselves’. In encounters with strangers, ethnicity is often the 
object of ‘games’ played with ethnic categories, sometimes involving the deliberate 
misrepresentation of a person’s own ethnic identity (Kolas 2008: 81-82).  
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Ethnic identities are multivalent and contingent, as they are increasingly exposed to 
influences from other cultures. Several scholars have argued that minority identities in China 
are not merely passively accepted or denied by those who are classified but consciously 
employed in many ways and for different purposes. Identities are being simultaneously 
negotiated and actively re-created (Kolas & Thowsen 2005: 42). Kolas highlights four 
different ways of how cultural identity is performative, and open to reconstruction in modern 
Tibet: to revive the religious life, to preserve and develop the Tibetan written lanugae, to 
develop new cultural products for the tourist market, and to shape their own modern Tibetan 
identity (particularly by Tibetan urban youth through popular culture).  In Kham region for 
instance, efforts have been made to revive the significance of the Khampa Arts Festival, 
hosted by Diqing in 1997. This ‘new’ (or renewed) Khampa identity is not understood as an 
ethnic (minzu) identity, but rather as a regional identity that bridges current provincial 
borders. The revived Khampa identity serves mainly to forge ties between Tibetans in 
Sichuan, Yunnan, and eastern Tibet Autonomous Region. It has not been promoted nor 
sanctioned by the state as an ethnic identity, but is rather an expression of the revival of 
economic and political cooperation among Tibetans across the current provincial boundaries 
(Kolas 2008: 83).  
 
Tibetan diaspora offer another important insight of how Tibetan identity can be constructed 
differently, as they are mostly living in liberal societies with more freedom to explore their 
own identities. Houston and Wright study Tibetan dispoaric identities by a focus of large 
amount of individual voices, and argue that Tibetan diasporic identities are contested, 
complex, and embedded in not one but multiple narratives of struggle (Houston & Wright 
2003: 226-227). Two stories are particularly informing to this discussion. By comparing the 
Tibetans living in four refugee communities, that is Jawalakhel, Boundhnath, Lazimpat, and 
Swayombhunath in Kathmandu and Nepal, Houston and Wright’s research shows stark class 
demarcation amongst Tibetans, and refute the conventional notion of Tibetan’s community 
solidarity as espoused by nationalism. 
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The second story is about how Tibetans in the US negotiate their identities. After immigrating 
to the US, and exposed to a liberal multiethnic and multicultural society, diasporic Tibetans 
there have two main differing responses to their new social environment (Houston and Wright 
2003: 228). Some claim that they value their own culture even more so and appreciate a 
strong ethnic community, when they see so many other ethnic groups are living peacefully 
with the whites. Others express the sense of freedom because they have moved away from the 
nationalist conception of a ‘pure’ Tibetan identity, and life in the US has changed the 
traditional religious, linguistic, and social practices, and adulterated Buddhist moral and 
ethical beliefs. All these day-to-day stories show that there are many ways to live a life as a 
Tibetan, and there are many different stories about Tibetan and Tibet.  
 
Whatever identity and whatever community 
There is an inherent contradiction between a community with contingent, fluid, and multi-
valent identities, as discussed above, and the current dominant nation-state communities with 
a national identity. The modern state is historically designed to have a form of belonging that 
affirms an identity.  In his philosophical text, Giorgio Agamben discusses the notion of 
‘whatever being’ as the foundation of a ‘coming community’ (Agamben 2003: I). Whatever 
being is whatever singularity, nothing more than its just being-such. Logically, the community 
of whatever singularities is not based on a sharing of properties or identities, but on a sharing 
nothing more than their singularity, their being-such or their ‘whatever-ness’ as such (Calarco 
& DeCaroli 2007: 74). The possibility of the whatever itself being taken up without an 
identity is a threat the state cannot come to terms with. (Agamben 2003: 86). Thus for 
Agamben, the coming politics is a struggle between the State or Sovereign power, and the 
non-State, or ‘humanity’. 
 
For Agamben, the strategy of drawing lines between forms of life is a sovereign move. And 
the purpose of this sovereign move by the state is to produce clarity and stability. It is, 
however, a move that cannot succeed, and that is immediately prone to destabilization, and 
opens the possibility of change, because of the multitude nature of any community. Whatever 
politics is a politics without distinctions between forms of life. Edkins proposes a number of 
principle practices for the building of a whatever community (Calarco & DeCaroli 2007: 90):  
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• Acknowledge the impossibility of distinguishing between forms of life; 
• Attempt to live with chaos 
• Work with negotiation and invention  
• Open to the vulnerability and the exposure of being 
• Forego the fantasy of an unattainable stabilisation and security. 
This conception of a community based on a whatever identity, this paper suggests, bears 
hopes to form a common ground for the resolution of the Tibet Question between China and 
Tibet. 
 
To sum up, this chapter has shown that personal identities are multivalent and contingent 
while heavily influenced by social discourses. And they are also immediately performative, 
and simultaneously negotiated and re-created. In contrast, collective identities are powerful, in 
that they establish a hegemonic view of both the categorization of people and the delimitation 
of territories, as we have seen in the case of Tibet and China. Community is never a clear or 
distinct entity, for it has no fixed or permanent boundaries to distinguish the inside from the 
outside of the community (Devetak 1995: 45). History is complex, and perhaps infinite. It is 
often contentious to look for justice by presenting historical narratives, as is witnessed in the 
decades-long disagreement between Tibet and China. It is thus more fruitful to look into the 
future for normative solutions that might transform the history and disputes. If, following 
critical theorists, the identities of a community are, and should be, whatever identities, what 
does this community with whatever identities look like? And what institutional invention can 
possibly lead to the community with whatever identities? The next chapter will address these 
questions. 
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‘It is time to get over the idea that a state has to express a nation. State should not be 
in the business of expressing cultural identity’ (Butler 2010). 
 
Whatever identity demands a different politics for the community. It thus calls for a different 
kind of institutional invention that moves beyond the conventional ones that are based on a 
collective identity. This logically turns the discussion to the interrelations between the state, 
institution and identity.  
 
 4.1 State, institution, and identity 
 
If critical theory is exclusively based on the uniqueness and singularity of the individual, it 
raises a question: how can societies manage to achieve solidarity within a population with 
whatever identity? In contrast to liberal’s multiculturalism based on strong conceptions of 
individual preference of their culture and strategic choice (Parekh 200232; Laitin 2007), Butler 
offers a distinctive roadmap towards community solidarity. Based on a subject as a dynamic 
set of social relations, Butler argues that coalitions do not necessarily form between 
established and recognizable subjects, and neither do they depend on the brokering of 
identitarian claims. Instead, mobilizing alliances may well be instigated by criticisms of 
arbitrary violence, the circumscription of the public sphere, the differential of powers enacted 
through prevalent nations of ‘culture’, and the instrumentalization of rights claims for 
resisting coercion and enfranchisement (Butler 2009: 162). Thus for Butler, solidarity lies in 
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the common resistance to social injustice and state violence, and the concerted actions based 
on it, rather than an unsustainable common identity. 
 
The human race is not divided naturally into nations. The state plays a central role in creating 
national identities not least by building education systems that promote shared values. 
Hobsbawm claims that there were no nations before nationalism (Hobsbawm 1990). There is 
very often, if not always, a state action involved in nationalism. Nationalists often use the 
power of the state to pursue their own Machiavellian visions, particularly in state-led 
nationalism (Hao 2010: 20). The relations of identity and the state, this paper suggests, 
deserve more scholarly attentions. Conventionally, the study of national identity was largely 
focused on the fields of cultural studies, sociology, while the study of state mainly falls into 
the brackets of world affairs and foreign policy. It was not until fairly recently that one would 
consider that the two concepts had much to do with each other. Robertson argues that national 
identities are very manipulable by the state, and the state has been increasing in strength on 
this matter (Robertson 2008: 65-67). 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Globalization, new cultural cleavages and ideological 
conflicts may be produced rather than shared moral and political beliefs. Globalization works 
in tandem with the nation-state. In the Yugoslav case, violent nationalism destroyed a 
multicultural political community when globalization brought about liberal democracy. If the 
state with its traditional institutions is the causal root of the problematic ‘identity’, the state is 
precisely where the changes or challenges should be made.  Although it is quite impossible 
for the world powers to relinquish the nation-states system in the near future, we can 
nonetheless explore the institutional reform to foster a community in which whatever 
identities may survive and flourish.  In what follows, this paper explores some of the possible 
institutional solutions for the Tibet Question. If there is inherent contradiction between the 
state and a unitary identity, to what extent is the state able to accommodate the multi-national 
community through institutional innovation? What forms of institution should the state 
employ to minimize the conflict in multi-national, or whatever identities, communities? 
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For modern state, marginalized ethnic-cultural groups are usually classified into either ethnic 
minorities or indigenous peoples. Kymlica maintains that rights enjoyed by these two types of 
people are significantly different: indigenous peoples enjoy the right to be accommodated; 
ethnic minorities enjoy the rights to be integrated. In Europe and North America, indigenous 
people mainly refer to those people who had been living in their homelands for centuries 
before the European colonist came, for instance, Indians in North America, Indigenous 
Australians, and Maori in New Zealand (Zheng 2010: 14-15). However, the line separating 
them is never clear cut. Even the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
Naitional or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), and the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) eschewed this task of defining these two subjects. 
 
Despite the contested nature of the categorization, there are two prevailing ethics approaches, 
not mutually exclusive for the state, to the issues of marginalized groups: communitarian and 
cosmopolitan approaches. Communitarians assert that individuals acquire their most 
fundamental rights and responsibilities as members of particular communities, not as general 
members of the human race. Walzer argues that citizenship refers to a web of political rights 
and duties which only exist when there is a strong sense of identification with the nation-state 
(Baylis 2009: 554). 
 
Many countries’ constitutional design is based on the communitarian approach, which 
includes the needs of minority groups to acknowledge and protect their culture, religion, 
language, and education. There are a number of mechanisms to ensure those needs (Zheng 
2010: 12):  
1. The design of special election mechanisms to make sure that political elites need to get 
enough votes from minority groups if they want to win in the election. 
2. Important decision-making bodies should reserve certain seats for members of 
minority group. 
3. The configuration of national political and administrative powers should comply with 
the principle of power sharing between majority and minority ethnic groups. Minority 
groups should have autonomous power to decide on their internal affairs. 
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4. Right to regional autonomy for a minority ethnic group if they constitute the majority 
in this region. 
 
Dalai Lama ‘Middle Way Approach’ is a case in point as an institutional design based on the 
communitarian approach: ‘The Tibetan people do not accept the present status of Tibet under 
the People's Republic of China. At the same time, they do not seek independence for Tibet, 
which is a historical fact’. The Middle-Way Approach, the Dalai Lama asserts, is a win-win 
design33. For Tibetans: the protection and preservation of their culture, religion and national 
identity; for the Chinese: the security and territorial integrity of the motherland; and for 
neighbours and other third parties: peaceful borders and international relations.  
 
Resistance to doctrines which claim that one race, nation, or gender has the right to dominate 
another is evident in most parts of the world. Modern nation-states have been challenged by 
egalitarian ideas which have challenged ‘natural’ hierarchies between people and groups. 
Skeptics are quick to stress the continuing appeal of nationalism, the tenacity of the state, and 
the weakness of cosmopolitan loyalties. Cosmopolitan liberals contend that national 
democracies have little control over global markets, and a limited ability to influence 
decisions taken by transnational corporations and international organizations, and propose 
cosmopolitan democracy, by which the members of different societies come together as 
cosmopolitan citizens to influence decisions that have global influence (Baylis 2009: 551). 
 
Cosmopolitanism is often adopted by nation-states in a narrower sense. Republican 
integrationists take up with stimulating and cultivating a ‘general will’ amongst citizens, who 
are concerned with the general welfare and common interests of the whole national polity, in 
order to protect national political process from being eroded by private and partial interests.  
To achieve national unity, the government needs to unify the national language, carry out 
civic/patriotic education, and implement egalitarian policies. Secularism or laïcité principle in 
French, and laiklik in Turkish constitutional law can be considered in this context (Zheng 
2010: 9). In these countries, students in public schools are not allowed to wear religious 
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 See the official website of the Dalai Lama: http://www.dalailama.com/messages/middle-way-approach (access on 
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symbols when attending classes. The state claims this policy can minimize the possibility of 
cultural and religious beliefs clashes and conflicts among citizens in the public sphere. In 
France, several Muslim girls were expelled from public school for wearing a headscarf. In 
2004, French legislature enacted a law to forbid wearing ‘conspicuous religious symbols’ in 
public schools.  
 
Butler has argued the problematic relationship between the nation and the state. She writes, ‘it 
is time to get over the idea that a state has to express a nation. State should not be in the 
business of expressing cultural identity’ (Butler 2010). Even in liberal society, the choices of 
national identity in the process of integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism, offered by 
the liberal state, are not free choices. A comparison of the Tibetans in the PRC with those in 
diaspora would provide evidence.  Hess’s study shows that the Tibetan refugees in the US 
struggle with their nationality, ethnicity, and citizenship (Hess 2006: 91). Much research has 
shown that new immigrants in liberal societies have to adapt to the new environment by 
learning the language, applying citizenship for the access of social welfare. All these 
processes are effectively forms of assimilation, particularly amongst the second (and further) 
generation immigrants.  Zizek makes one of the most blatant criticisms to multiculturalism in 
liberal society. He argues that identity politics, or multiculturalism, involves patronizing 
Eurocentrist distance and respect for local cultures without roots in one’s own particular 
culture, and is essentially racism (Butler et al. 2000; 101, 326). Indeed, liberalism underwrites 
freedom of choice, but only within prescribed limits. 
 
By contrast, the PRC’s constitutional design for ethnic minorities is based on Marxism. 
Marxism resonates with cosmopolitanism. Marx has argued, ‘The bourgeoisie has through its 
exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country…The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments 
of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the 
most barbarian nations, into civilization. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt 
the bourgeoisie themselves. In one world, it creates a world after its own image.’ (Karl Marx, 
Baylis p552). 
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The PRC’s Marxist cosmopolitan institution is called ‘Regional Ethnic Autonomy’ (REA), 
under Article 4 of the PRC constitution. REA is one of the three ‘Basic Political Institutions’ 
(jiben zhengzhi zhidu) in the PRC (Zheng 2010: 25). On the one hand, the Chinese 
constitutional prohibition on ‘big-nation chauvinism (especially Han Chinese Chauvinism)’ 
and local nationalism (namely, nationalism among minority ethnic people) in China can be 
considered as an example of Republican integrationist design. On the other hand, the PRC 
constitution also proclaims to accommodate minority groups and protect their rights. Overall, 
the nationalities regime outlined in the PRC Constitution is not unique. There are both 
cosmopolitan and communitarian, or integrationist and accommodationist approaches in the 
PRC Constitution, that we can easily find in many other liberal states (Table 4.1). However, 
the PRC vastly fails in practice to live up to these principles.  
Accommodation Integration 
Regional autonomy should be practiced in areas 
where people of minority nationalities live in 
compact communities; (Article 4) 
China is a unitary multi-national state built up jointly 
by the people of all its nationalities; 
In these areas organs of self-government should be 
established for the exercise of the right of autonomy; 
(Article 4) 
The relationship between China’s 56 nationalities is 
one of ‘equality, unity, and mutual assistance’; 
The people of all nationalities have the freedom to 
use and develop their own spoken and written 
languages, and to preserve or perform their own 
ways of life and customs; (Article 4) 
To safeguard the solidarity of China’s diverse 
nationalities, it is necessary to ‘combat big-nation 
chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also 
necessary to combat local-national chauvinism’; 
More provisions on the scope and operational rules 
of the power enjoyed by the autonomous authorities, 
showing certain characteristics of multiculturalism. 
(Chapter 3) 
Prohibitions on discrimination, oppression, and 
instigations for secession; (Article 4)  
There should be a sufficient number of 
representatives for the ethnic minorities in China’s 
highest state organ –the national People’s Congress 
(NPC); (Article 59) 
A unitary citizenship regardless of nationalities, and 
equal protection under the law; (Article 33) 
 The state ‘promote’ a common language for all 
citizens in China, which is ‘Putonghua’; (Article 19) 
Table 4.1: Comparison of constitutional elements for Ethnic Minorities in the Chinese Constitution. 
(Based on Zheng Ge. 2010. “Towards Cultural Autonomy in Tibet”)  
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In the case of the Tibet Question, the institutional solution debate is constantly dominated by 
either Chinese nationalism (assimilation) or Tibetan nationalism (autonomy) (note – Dalai’s 
mid way is actually close to independence). Hardt and Negri argue, ‘the very concept of a 
liberatory national sovereignty is ambiguous if not completely contradictory’. While this 
nationalism seeks to liberate the multitude from foreign domination; it erects domestic 
structures of domination that are equally severe (Hardt & Negri 2000: 133). From this point 
of view, it is clear that neither Chinese nationalism nor Tibetan nationalism would be a good 
solution to the Tibet Question.  The future of Tibet should not fall too easily into a choice 
between bad alternatives: either submission to China’s rule or return to traditional Tibetan 
social structures; either foreign domination or local domination. 
 
4.2 The future of community building 
 
Few would dispute about the importance of the role that the modern state plays in community 
building in IR. It is vastly assumed that nation and state is the natural night-watcher of any 
community. Critical theorists, however, put the existing states-system into scrutiny, and assert 
that states-system, rather than contribute to the security of human autonomy, is integral to the 
continual frustration of autonomy and genuine security (Devetak 1995: 38).  Amongst them, 
post-structualists argue that all forms of political community contain the danger of domination 
or exclusion. Foucault’s claim that all forms of knowledge are potentially dangerous, 
including those that are designed to promote progress, informs poststructuralists’ critique. 
Poststructuralists do not have faith in communitarianism, which often overlooks that the 
dominant constructions of community exclude marginal groups.  It has been argued in 
Chapter three that there are rights violations within traditional Tibetan society, and the notion 
of a collective Tibetan identity and culture is unsustainable.  Nor do poststructuralists trust 
cosmopolitan political community. For them, the warning is that the danger of exclusion will 
remain whether peoples remain loyal to sovereign states or try to build new forms of political 
community at the regional and global levels. The target of post-structuralism international 
theory is the traditional conception of community which is tied to notions of totality, 
boundaries, and identity, all of which are captured in the notion of sovereignty. The 
philosophical task then consists in undoing sovereignty by questioning the legitimacy of its 
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closed community, problematizing its boundaries and identity, and thinking what community 
without sovereignty might mean (Devetak 1995: 44).  
 
Feminists concur that large numbers of women suffer exclusion at the hands of ‘their’ 
community. (Baylis p555). They also resonate with the critique of identity and community. 
Sylvester elaborates a notion of ‘homeless homesteading’ which is based on the recognition of 
multiple, hyphenated identities. Rather than presuppose a fixed limit or essence to identity 
and community, this idea registers the ongoing ‘process of identity slippage’. Sylvester 
particularly argues that this lack of self-sameness makes possible greater empathetic 
cooperation (Devetak 1995: 46). 
 
Although sovereign states would not disappear overnight, and actually will be the dominant 
form of community in the foreseeable future, there are changes that can be made to the 
boundaries of state power.  At least some aspects of human life, such as culture, ethnicity, 
race, citizenship, gender and identities should be subject to debate whether the state has the 
rule on them.  Political communities acquired greater legitimacy by becoming more inclusive, 
and by giving all citizens the legal, political, and social rights which had previously been 
monopolized by dominant groups (Baylis 2009: 548). It is time to rethink about the state 
institutional reform that moves beyond nationalism and multinationalism.  
 
Many scholars, especially Tibetologists, have eagerly anticipated the future institutional 
invention for the Tibet Question. Few of them argue for a full independence of Tibet from the 
PRC. Norbu, for example, suggests a design of a Federal Republic of China that has its own 
Constitution with special autonomous Statehood given to Inner Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Guangxi (Norbu 2001: 351). Norbu’s argument essentially premises 
on the notion of a Tibet as a unitary culture and a common ethnicity. The problematics of a 
collective identity have been well discussed in the previous chapters. Besides, there are three 
main pratical problems of this design.  
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Firstly, it is impossible for the CCP to give up sovereignty over Tibet. There will be territory 
disputes involved in the federation design, as there are obviously different understandings of 
Tibetan territory between two parties, and the PRC definitely will not compromise on the 
TGIE’s claim of the extra territories in the provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Many 
scholars have also argued that there is not even such thing as ‘de facto State’ under 
international law (Chiang 200534 ; Sautman 2010; Chan 2009). Secondly it is an unfair, 
exclusive, and violent institutional design for Han and other ethnic populations who have 
been living, or settled down with the local Tibetans. Moreover, it runs the risk of the state 
power being shifted from the Han elites to Tibetan elites. Lastly, there has been a notable 
decline in support for Tibet’s independence from other state governments since the Dalai 
Lama started to promote Tibet’s sovereignty in the West. It now appears that the disintegration 
of China, hoped for by the TGIE, is not yet happening. Instead, China has emerged as a 
regional great power and gained support from the international community for its sovereignty 
and territory. The US Congress passed a non-binding resolution in 1990 stating ‘Tibet is an 
occupied country’ (He & Sautman 2005/2006: 605). It has rarely repeated any more. Even the 
two traditional allies of Tibet have changed their position. Britain had spoken in terms of 
China’s ‘suzerainty’ in Tibet since 1906, but now acknowledges the PRC’s sovereignty. Indian 
Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that TAR is a part of China in his 2003 visit to China (He & 
Sauntman 2005/2006: 607).  All of the above practical problems would not allow the 
federation solution to happen. 
 
Many others, by contrast, propose institutional invention within the PRC sovereignty. From 
an economic development perspective, Wolff proposes a special institutional design of Tibet 
called ‘Mountain coastal’ region, or Special Ethnic Trade and Ecological Zone, so that 
China’s Tibet could be transformed from being an embarrassment for China into a regional 
leader of its neighboring Himalayan states and an efficient portal for China’s trans-Himalayan 
trade with India and other SAARC members (Wolff 2010: xiii). Wolff’s design is the epitome 
of cliché liberal’s belief that economic development, by free trade and open market in 
particular, will be able to transform political cleavages. However, there is little empirical 
evidence that economic cooperation alone can solve the sovereign issues of Taiwan and Tibet.  
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Zhang Ge asserts that the constitutional design of the PRC is theoretically sufficient to 
accommodate the ethnic minorities, with its intention being to integrate political, 
administrative, and economic spheres while preserving ethnic identity in the cultural sphere. 
However, he argues, it in practice fails to provide institutional demarcation of these different 
spheres. Therefore he proposes to set up a ‘Special Cultural Region’ to coordinate the cultural 
administration and policies in Greater Tibet without affecting the normal political and 
economic functioning of TAR as a territorial unit (Zheng 2010). Although Zhang’s argument 
premises on a collective national identity for a community, its institutional design of the 
separation of cultural sphere from state sovereignty does provide a promising direction for the 
solution of the Tibet Question. 
  
 Wang Lixiong, by contrast, suggests a democratic reform, a so-called ‘indirect representative 
system from the bottom’, which would reduce Tibetan’s motivation for independence while 
bringing a Greater Tibet autonomy into reality (Sautman 2006: 107-126). Wang is fully aware 
of the double-edged sword effect of democracy, particularly the Western style democracy that 
involves public debate and general election. He argues that a system of indirect 
representation, in which peasants dispersed across a wide area need only elect the village 
leader, will suit the Tibetan societies where the majority of the people are agricultural and 
nomadic with low level of literacy and political experience. Furthermore, Wang believes this 
‘bottom-up’ representation can prevent a bad transition of political power, which is simply a 
change from the Han elites’ rule over Tibetans to the Tibetan elites’ rule over Tibetans.  
 
Most of the suggested institutional designs premise on the preservation of an essential and 
exclusive identity of Tibet, which on the outset is bound to be problematic for a community 
with contingent identities. Nonetheless, they have more or less provided some valuable 
elements for institutional reform that may move beyond the identity demarcation. This task of 
the institutional invention for a whatever community is extremely difficult and notably it is 
only at the embryonic stage of developing the idea.  Critical theorist Hardt and Negri have 
proposed a ‘three-point solution’ for a community that is based on, not ‘the people’ or ‘the 
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nation’, but ‘the multitude’, i.e. a whatever identity community (Hardt & Negri 2000: 393-
413):  
• Global citizenship: all should have the full rights of citizenship in the country where 
they work and live, and to decide if, when, and where to move;  
• A social wage and a guaranteed income for the multitude, regardless of their race, 
ethnicity, gender, or occupation, even the unemployed; 
• The right to reappropriation: the multitude should have free access to and control over 
knowledge, information, communication, and affects, which guarantee the right to 
self-control and autonomous self-production. 
These basic principles of community building resonate with Butler’s political design that a 
coalition is built by the mass against the violence of the state. In what follows, this research 
paper constructs a number of principles in the case of Tibet and China by combining critical 
theorists’ vision and the practical schemes of institutional design for Tibet by scholars, in the 
hope that they will ensure the peaceful coexistence of both the PRC and Tibet, and lead to a 
fair community building for the multitude. These principles are proposed only as a framework 
for further research, with no detail of the specific functions of the institutional design. 
 
For the PRC, the first and foremost principle should be adopted for the peaceful community 
building is a genuine democracy. Pei has argued that political reform is far from sufficient for 
sustainable economic development in PRC (Pei 2006). This lack of political reforms is the 
core problem in China today, which has led to the rampant official corruption, the erosion of 
state capacity – ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, and the growing imbalances in society and 
polity. Despite the general optimistic views on Chin’s rise and the fact that China is still 
growing, China will have to sooner or later address these inherent problems in its 
‘developmental autocracy’.  Pei envisages one way of breaking the political stagnancy is a 
“middle-up” reform that might take place in some local, regional level, leading to 
development divergence. The ‘bottom-up’ indirect representational democracy, proposed by 
Wang, is another direction worth exploring for China so that it will not fall into either China’s 
authoritarian rule or wholesale copy of the West democracy (Sautman 2006: 107). Even 
though no one can be certain how and when China would make this transition, this form of 
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democratization from the bottom or the local actually is not merely a utopian thought. It will 
have a major appeal for the ‘face’-concerned CCP because of its distinctness from the 
Western democracy. Democracy achieved by political reform, however, does not imply 
resolution of the ethnic problems. It is empirically proven that democracy can become a 
catalyst for the outbreak of ethnic problems35 . A democratic reform in China has to be 
complemented by other principles. 
 
Secondly, the PRC needs to rethink about the guiding principle in its ethnic policies. The 
characterization of ethnic markers and the categorization of ethnic groups were undertaken by 
ethnologoists working in state-sponsored academic institutions. Some of the most influential 
construction of ethnic culture has thus taken place in institutions and academies that are 
carrying out ethnographic research. Ironically, the minzu identification project, together with 
the preferential policies accorded minorities, may have reinforced ethnic identities that were 
almost forgotten (Kolas & Thowsen 2005: 39). There has been rapid change toward the way 
the state classifies the population. Today no liberal countries put race in any form of ID.  In 
terms of gender identity, the Home Office's Identity and Passport Service (IPS) in the UK , for 
instance, is considering the reform of the gender options available in the British passport. UK 
passport holders may be able to opt out of identifying themselves as male or female in the 
future 36 . For China, it is time to consider how to properly redesign its state ethnicity 
categorization, either by ceasing of the problematic categorization of ethnicity in the census 
and all the official ID documents, or by the use of more place-oriented, open, flexible, non-
exclusive forms of classification. 
 
Thirdly, the hukou (household registration) system in the PRC needs to be reformed to 
accommodate economic development, and the vastly diverse forms of life in the territory. The 
regional development disparity is one of the fundamental stimulators for ethnic conflicts, as is 
discussed in the last chapter. Wang’s study shows that the hukou-based institutional exclusion 
in China is one of the main causes for the regional development disparity (Wang 2011: 111-
120). This old Qin-Han institutional design has been solidifying and reinforcing the rural-
urban and interregional gaps for generations. Wang’s study on China’s hukou system shows 
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that this institutional design has been a key floodgate that is now under increasing strain, and 
the renovation of it holds the future hopes and hypes about narrowing the regional disparity of 
development and redistribution. Perhaps combining Wang’s observation with Hardt & Negri’s 
vision, the PRC needs to seriously consider demolishing this institutional exclusion of  the 
obsolete hukou system, and creating a uniform hukou category, which will enable all citizens 
to have freedom to migrate, work, and live wherever they are economically settled and 
culturally attached to. Ethnicity and Hukou status should not be the business of the state. 
Instead, the state can focus more on economic indicators, such as household income and GDP 
per capita, and use economic methods, such as taxation and subsidies, to tackle the problems 
of migration, regional disparity, and imbalanced distribution of resources and wealth.  This 
institutional reform can possibly kill two birds with one stone, solving both the urban-rural 
disparity and the ethnic conflicts. 
 
Fourthly, in the long run, the PRC needs to consider the separation of the cultural sphere from 
the political and economic sphere, and the embracement of the civil society to deal with 
citizens’ cultural life. Since every national identity that builds on a founding myth and a 
common history/culture is necessarily a hegemonic construction, the nation-state form of 
community functions inherently through the exclusion of some marginal groups. As the case 
of Tibet has shown, individuals are the producers of culture. The cultural sphere should be 
returned and open to the realm of individuals and civil society, rather than served as an 
ideology of the state. In the short term, The PRC needs to address the issue of the Han 
chauvinism trumping the ethnic policies endorsed by the Constitution, as Zheng’s study 
suggests (Zheng 2010). In the long run, however, the PRC might need to consider a 
constitutional demarcation between cultural sphere and the state politics in order to achieve a 
thorough cultural autonomy for any ethnicity or minority. Perhaps even more importantly, 
China has to learn to uphold the ‘rule of the law’, developing an independent local judiciary 
system with full responsibility for interpreting local laws. 
 
For Tibet, in contrast, there are changes to be made as well. Firstly, Tibet authority, i.e. the 
TGIE, should be strategic with use of the problematic national identity and territory claim. 
The discursive and contested construction of the Tibetan (and Chinese) national identity has 
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demonstrated that there is nothing essential about the identity in struggle. The White and the 
Black, the West and the Orient, the Chinese and the Tibetan, are all representations that 
function only in relation to each other. Despite appearances, ethnic / national identity has no 
real necessary basis in nature, biology, culture, or rationality (Hardt & Negri 2000: 129). The 
Tibetan nationalist movement has certainly some progressive characteristics vis-à-vis the 
Chinese autocratic state, just as the Chinese had in its de-colonization over 60 years ago. The 
progressive functions of national sovereignty, however, are always accompanied by powerful 
structures of internal domination and inevitable antagonism of external exclusion. To counter 
the political hegemony of the CCP, an ‘eye for eye’ strategy, one of inversion of the 
hegemon’s logic itself, is not the only possible option for Tibet. At a practical level, many 
scholars have pointed to the cost of Tibet’s national independence, comparable to the disasters 
in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Sautman 2010: 142).  
 
Secondly, the future of the political structure of the TGIE deserves a serious and on-going 
reflection by the authority. A political reform for the post-Dalai Lama era should be one of the 
top agendas for the TGIE too, as the current Dalai Lama is approaching his 80’s. A 
democratized government is one of the main thrusts by the Tibetan authority against the 
PRC’s rule. However, the powerful role of the religion, i.e. the Dalai Lama, is clearly 
questionable for a true democracy. The TGIE democracy is heavily tinted by the overriding 
power of the Dalai Lama, who gave instructions for direct elections and an increase in 
parliament’s power (Sautman 2005/2006: 622). The future of a truly democratic Tibet should 
not be hinged on a religious leader, or the Tulkus (the next reincarnated Dalai Lama), but a 
genuine democratic system. 
 
Thirdly, Tibet needs to address the internal problems of the violation of the rights towards 
other marginal groups. Although Tibetans are generally perceived as an oppressed minority 
group in China, the story in reality is not simply black or white. On the one hand, there are 
human rights issues within the group. Tibetan women in general are treated inferior in the 
social hierarchy. As the nationalist movement dominates the political agenda, the advocacy 
for Tibetan women’s rights has been vastly ignored, for instance in the case of the work by 
The Tibetan Women’s Association. On the other hand, it is equally easy to dismiss by 
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commentators that some Tibetan elites have become the discriminator against other marginal 
groups, as in the case of the urban Tibetans calling the rural Han as ‘Han trash’ (Hu & Salazar 
2008: 15). The Tibetan authority needs to face these diverse problems within the territory and 
address them sooner rather than later. With the fast development of information technology, 
people will know exactly what happens rather than merely follow the black-and-white state 
propaganda. As people move and cultures hybridize, people living in the Tibetan territory are 
vastly diverse. The future of this land called ‘Tibet’ lies in the solidarity by all the people, 
with whatever nationality, whatever gender, whatever religious belief, urban or rural, to form 
coalition to fight for their principle rights against the violence and injustice of the one-party 
state. 
 
In summary, this chapter has explored the possible institutional reform for the peaceful 
resolution of the Tibet Question. The chapter argues that neither Chinese nationalism nor 
Tibetan nationalism would be a solution to the Tibet Question, and that the future of the 
community building for Tibet and China cannot be based on a common identity of a nation, 
which at once homogenizes internally and excludes externally. Rather, this chapter argues for 
an alternative approach to community building that respects the multitude with contingent 
identities, and proposes a number of guiding principles of institutional reform for the future 
community building for Tibet and China. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
 
 
In the light of the above discussions, this paper concludes that the collective identity of Tibet 
and China is a highly contested and hegemonic construction; therefore it is never sustainable 
and justifiable for community building. Tibet, as well as China, should look beyond 
identity/culture identity and search for an alternative approach to nation/state building without 
succumbing to either Chinese nationalism or Tibetan nationalism. This research paper 
proposes that the future community building in Tibet is dependent on the institutional reform 
that is based on open and inclusive identities, i.e. the recognition of the singularity of the 
multitude. The fervent use of the term ‘identity’ and the appeals of nationalism are no doubt 
going to continue in the public discourse, in China or Tibet.  The future of Tibet would remain 
debatable in decades to come as well.  Nonetheless, this paper draws attention to the ways in 
which critical international theory may valuably inform the discussion of the Tibet Question: 
 
Firstly, this paper calls for the problematization of the identity of ‘Tibet’, and the careful, and 
perhaps strategic, use of the term ‘identity’ 37 . The study in this research indicates that 
identitarain essentialism is still ubiquitous today. Who are the Tibetans? It should be clear 
now that Tibetan culture and Tibetan identities are not established entities that are available 
for us to re-discover, or to defend against the others. Whereas social science and anthropology 
have used the term ‘culture’ as something contested or invented, rather than shared or 
‘public’; International Relations remains a conservative discipline on the conceptual clarity of 
the term. The argument of ‘the clash of civilization’ by Huntington is more dangerous than 
helpful. The notion of ethnic conflicts, framed by Tibet and China, and tacitly reinforced by 
mainstream IR scholarship, misses the nature of political struggles in today’s China. The Han, 
as such, are not the hindrance of Tibetans’ liberation. The Han-Tibet cleavage masks the 
                                               
37
 How should we talk about identity without reification, just as to talk about race without racism? A debate between 
feminists is particularly inspiring at this point. How are feminists supposed to discuss woman if the mere utterance of the 
subject might risk being an essentailist? Spivak suggests that feminists need to rely on an ‘operational essentialism’, and use 
the term women for ‘strategic purposes’ Strategy here implies ‘persistent critique’ for Spivak (Spivak 1990: 325). 
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deeper root of all the social tensions (human rights, development, freedom), i.e. the CCP party 
state. Political solidarity would be stronger if all citizens, with whatever nationality, whatever 
gender, whatever religious belief, urban or rural, unite and form coalition to fight for their 
principle rights against the violence and injustice of the one-party state. 
 
Secondly, this paper emphasizes the importance of relationality rather than identity in the 
discussion of the Tibet Question. Although the dialogue between the Dalai Lama (or 
representatives) and the PRC has been on going since 2002, there has been little progress 
achieved because of the enormous cognitive gaps between the Tibetan exile and the PRC. 
Tibet and China should both be open to mutual influences from each other’s cultures and 
traditions. Assimilation, in itself and of itself, is never one way or necessarily harmful. Tibet 
can embrace the modernization brought about by the PRC and the West, if the PRC could be 
more relaxed about the expression of cultural identities by the ordinary Tibetans. As He and 
Sautman puts it, patience is the key to progress, as it is impossible to remove fifty years of 
distrust through a few visits (He & Sautman 2005/2006: 624).  
 
Last but not the least, this paper suggests that both the PRC and Tibet should look forward, 
rather than backward, to the future of the peaceful resolution of the Tibet Question. There is 
not much point dwelling on the complex and contested narratives of history for both parties, 
especially Tibet, if identity/culture is only a myth. The future of Tibet and China is what they 
make of it. The historical opportunity has come, considering China has become a regional 
great power with economic success. China should put political reform as a top priority, 
particularly loosening the institutional classification and control over the populations. Right at 
the moment of writing this conclusion, the CCP has issued a guideline that ‘proposes creating 
a unified household registration system’, as well as ‘granting equal access to public services’ 
(employment assistance, compulsory education, and occupational training) for rural 
residents 38 . A democratic China would surely vindicate its bad ‘identity’ of communist 
autocracy, which is one of the fundamental causes for Tibet, Taiwan, and any other sovereign 
disputes. Moreover, China should genuinely take care of the issues of regional disparity and 
distribution imbalance, which have caused full-blown social unrests and protests. Rather than 
                                               
38
 “China to guarantee migrants access to public services” on http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-
02/23/c_131427981.htm (23/02/2012, access on 23/02/2012). 
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spending billions of dollars on Olympics and a Space Project, China should seriously re-direct 
the resources to the poor and the marginalised to live up to its recent strategy of constructing a 
‘harmonious society’39 under the leadership of Hu Jintao and the upcoming Xi Jinping. 
 
The conclusion made means not just an end of this research paper, but a prospect for further 
research based on the result of the evaluation. Like any research, there are obviously 
limitations in this research. Above all there is no field research and not much quantitative 
study involved, partly because of the uncertain credibility of the available data on Tibet, but 
primarily because of the time and resources constraint of this program. A future project that is 
supported by first-hand surveys and visits would secure a stronger argument. Secondly, the 
discourse analysis on Tibetan identities by employing the content and contestation framework 
(chapter 3) is largely theoretical supported by short case studies. Furthermore, the analysis of 
the discursive construction of Tibetan identity is largely descriptive rather than definitive, 
precisely because of the contingent and fluid nature of ‘identity’. However, some quantitative 
supplement would have been useful if resources permitted. Finally, the answer to the 
institutional reform for Tibet with a critical approach (chapter 4) remains vague, as the whole 
idea is still at the developing stage. And this area may warrant further research in the future.  
 
                                               
39
 The concept of "harmonious socialist society" was first launched at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Communist 
Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and further interpreted by Chinese President Hu Jintao at a routine high-level Party 
seminar held prior to the sessions of NPC and the National Committee of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) in 2005 to set the keynote of the social and economic development. See website: 
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